Ideas from 'Lewis's Programme' by Paul Horwich [1987], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Causation' (ed/tr Sosa,E. /Tooley,M.) [OUP 1993,0-19-875094-3]].

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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals

8431	Problems with Goodman's view of counterfactuals led to a radical approach from Stalnaker and Lewis

			Full Idea: In reaction to two classic difficulties in Goodman's treatment of counterfactuals - the contenability problem and the explication of law - a radically different approach was instigated by Stalnaker (1968) and has been developed by Lewis.
			From: Paul Horwich (Lewis's Programme [1987], p208)
			A reaction: [I record this for study purposes]

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation

8432	Analyse counterfactuals using causation, not the other way around

			Full Idea: In my view, counterfactual conditionals are analysed in terms of causation.
			From: Paul Horwich (Lewis's Programme [1987], p.208)
			A reaction: This immediately sounds more plausible to me. Counterfactual claims are rather human, whereas causation (if we accept it) seems a feature of nature. The key question is whether some sort of 'dependency' is a feature of counterfactuals.