Ideas from 'Brainchildren' by Daniel C. Dennett [1998], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Brainchildren' by Dennett,Daniel C. [Penguin 1998,0-14-026563-5]].

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10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary

2526	Philosophers regularly confuse failures of imagination with insights into necessity

			Full Idea: The besetting foible of philosophers is mistaking failures of imagination for insights into necessity.
			From: Daniel C. Dennett (Brainchildren [1998], Ch.25)

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique

2523	That every mammal has a mother is a secure reality, but without foundations

			Full Idea: Naturalistic philosophers should look with favour on the finite regress that peters out without foundations or thresholds or essences. That every mammal has a mother does not imply an infinite regress. Mammals have secure reality without foundations.
			From: Daniel C. Dennett (Brainchildren [1998], Ch.25)
			A reaction: I love this thought, which has permeated my thinking quite extensively. Logicians are terrified of regresses, but this may be because they haven't understood the vagueness of language.

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness

2528	Does consciousness need the concept of consciousness?

			Full Idea: You can't have consciousness until you have the concept of consciousness.
			From: Daniel C. Dennett (Brainchildren [1998], Ch.6)
			A reaction: If you read enough Dennett this begins to sound vaguely plausible, but next day it sounds like an absurd claim. 'You can't see a tree until you have the concept of a tree?' When do children acquire the concept of consciousness? Are apes non-conscious?

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / c. Parts of consciousness

2525	Maybe language is crucial to consciousness

			Full Idea: I continue to argue for a crucial role of natural language in generating the central features of consciousness.
			From: Daniel C. Dennett (Brainchildren [1998], Ch.25)
			A reaction: 'Central features' might beg the question. Dennett does doubt the consciousness of animals (1996). As I stare out of my window, his proposal seems deeply counterintuitive. How could language 'generate' consciousness? Would loss of language create zombies?

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories

2527	Unconscious intentionality is the foundation of the mind

			Full Idea: It is on the foundation of unconscious intentionality that the higher-order complexities developed that have culminated in what we call consciousness.
			From: Daniel C. Dennett (Brainchildren [1998], Ch.25)
			A reaction: Sounds right to me. Pace Searle, I have no problem with unconscious intentionality, and the general homuncular picture of low levels building up to complex high levels, which suddenly burst into the song and dance of consciousness.

17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism

2530	Could a robot be made conscious just by software?

			Full Idea: How could you make a robot conscious? The answer, I think, is to be found in software.
			From: Daniel C. Dennett (Brainchildren [1998], Ch.6)
			A reaction: This seems to be a commitment to strong AI, though Dennett is keen to point out that brains are the only plausible implementation of such software. Most find his claim baffling.

18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought

2524	A language of thought doesn't explain content

			Full Idea: Postulating a language of thought is a postponement of the central problems of content ascription, not a necessary first step.
			From: Daniel C. Dennett (Brainchildren [1998], Ch.25)
			A reaction: If the idea of content is built on the idea of representation, then you need some account of what the brain does with its representations.

18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / c. Concepts without language

2529	Maybe there can be non-conscious concepts (e.g. in bees)

			Full Idea: Concepts do not require consciousness. As Jaynes says, the bee has a concept of a flower, but not a conscious concept.
			From: Daniel C. Dennett (Brainchildren [1998], Ch.6)
			A reaction: Does the flower have a concept of rain? Rain plays a big functional role in its existence. It depends, alas, on what we mean by a 'concept'.