Ideas from 'Lives of Eminent Philosophers' by Diogenes Laertius [250], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Diogenes Laertius' by Diogenes Laertius (ed/tr Yonge,C.D.) [Henry G. Bohn 1853,-]].
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2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
3035
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Dialectic involves conversations with short questions and brief answers
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Full Idea:
Dialectic is when men converse by putting short questions and giving brief answers to those who question them.
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From:
Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 3.1.52)
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13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
1816
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Sceptics say demonstration depends on self-demonstrating things, or indemonstrable things
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Full Idea:
Sceptics say that every demonstration depends on things which demonstrates themselves, or on things which can't be demonstrated.
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From:
Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 9.Py.11)
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A reaction:
This refers to two parts of Agrippa's Trilemma (the third being that demonstration could go on forever). He makes the first option sound very rationalist, rather than experiential.
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13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
1819
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Scepticism has two dogmas: that nothing is definable, and every argument has an opposite argument
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Full Idea:
Sceptics actually assert two dogmas: that nothing should be defined, and that every argument has an opposite argument.
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From:
Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 9.Py.11)
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13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
3064
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When sceptics say that nothing is definable, or all arguments have an opposite, they are being dogmatic
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Full Idea:
When sceptics say that they define nothing, and that every argument has an opposite argument, they here give a positive definition, and assert a positive dogma.
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From:
Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 9.11.11)
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14. Science / C. Induction / 4. Reason in Induction
3033
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Induction moves from some truths to similar ones, by contraries or consequents
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Full Idea:
Induction is an argument which by means of some admitted truths establishes naturally other truths which resemble them; there are two kinds, one proceeding from contraries, the other from consequents.
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From:
Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 3.1.23)
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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / b. Types of pleasure
1838
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Cyrenaic pleasure is a motion, but Epicurean pleasure is a condition
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Full Idea:
Cyrenaics place pleasure wholly in motion, whereas Epicurus admits it as a condition.
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From:
Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 10.28)
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A reaction:
Not a distinction we meet in modern discussions. Do events within the mind count as 'motion'? If so, these two agree. If not, I'd vote for Epicurus.
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23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
1769
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Cynics believe that when a man wishes for nothing he is like the gods
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Full Idea:
Cynics believe that when a man wishes for nothing he is like the gods.
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From:
Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 6.Men.3)
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