Ideas from 'On What Grounds What' by Jonathan Schaffer [2009], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Metametaphysics' (ed/tr Chalmers/Manley/Wasserman) [OUP 2009,978-0-19-954600-8]].
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1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
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13734
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Modern Quinean metaphysics is about what exists, but Aristotelian metaphysics asks about grounding
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1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
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13751
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If you tore the metaphysics out of philosophy, the whole enterprise would collapse
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2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
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13743
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We should not multiply basic entities, but we can have as many derivative entities as we like
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6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
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13741
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If 'there are red roses' implies 'there are roses', then 'there are prime numbers' implies 'there are numbers'
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
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13748
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Grounding is unanalysable and primitive, and is the basic structuring concept in metaphysics
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
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13747
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Supervenience is just modal correlation
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
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13744
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The cosmos is the only fundamental entity, from which all else exists by abstraction
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7. Existence / E. Categories / 4. Category Realism
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13739
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Maybe categories are just the different ways that things depend on basic substances
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
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13742
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There exist heaps with no integral unity, so we should accept arbitrary composites in the same way
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13752
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The notion of 'grounding' can explain integrated wholes in a way that mere aggregates can't
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / b. Impossible worlds
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13749
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Belief in impossible worlds may require dialetheism
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11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty
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13740
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'Moorean certainties' are more credible than any sceptical argument
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