Ideas from 'Person and Object' by Roderick Chisholm [1976], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Person and Object' by Chisholm,Roderick [Open Court 1976,0-8126-9428-7]].
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1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
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15801
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Many philosophers aim to understand metaphysics by studying ourselves
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1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 6. Logical Analysis
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15802
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I use variables to show that each item remains the same entity throughout
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7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
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15832
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Events are states of affairs that occur at certain places and times
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 9. States of Affairs
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15829
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The mark of a state of affairs is that it is capable of being accepted
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15809
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A state of affairs pertains to a thing if it implies that it has some property
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15828
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I propose that events and propositions are two types of states of affairs
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
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15830
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Some properties can never be had, like being a round square
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15827
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Some properties, such as 'being a widow', can be seen as 'rooted outside the time they are had'
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
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15804
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If some dogs are brown, that entails the properties of 'being brown' and 'being canine'
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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
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15810
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Maybe we can only individuate things by relating them to ourselves
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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
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15805
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Being the tallest man is an 'individual concept', but not a haecceity
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15807
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A haecceity is a property had necessarily, and strictly confined to one entity
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
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15814
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A peach is sweet and fuzzy, but it doesn't 'have' those qualities
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
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12852
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If x is ever part of y, then y is necessarily such that x is part of y at any time that y exists [Simons]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
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15808
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A traditional individual essence includes all of a thing's necessary characteristics
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9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 7. Intermittent Objects
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12851
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Intermittence is seen in a toy fort, which is dismantled then rebuilt with the same bricks [Simons]
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
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15806
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The property of being identical with me is an individual concept
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 9. Sameness
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15826
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There is 'loose' identity between things if their properties, or truths about them, might differ
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12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
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15819
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Do sense-data have structure, location, weight, and constituting matter?
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12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 8. Adverbial Theory
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15816
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'I feel depressed' is more like 'he runs slowly' than like 'he has a red book'
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15818
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So called 'sense-data' are best seen as 'modifications' of the person experiencing them
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15817
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If we can say a man senses 'redly', why not also 'rectangularly'?
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
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15831
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Explanations have states of affairs as their objects
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16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 3. Self as Non-physical
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15811
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I am picked out uniquely by my individual essence, which is 'being identical with myself'
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16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
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15815
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Sartre says the ego is 'opaque'; I prefer to say that it is 'transparent'
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16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 3. Reference of 'I'
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15813
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People use 'I' to refer to themselves, with the meaning of their own individual essence
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16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 1. Self as Indeterminate
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15803
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Bad theories of the self see it as abstract, or as a bundle, or as a process
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
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15821
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Determinism claims that every event has a sufficient causal pre-condition
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20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / c. Omissions
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15824
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There are mere omissions (through ignorance, perhaps), and people can 'commit an omission'
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26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
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15822
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The concept of physical necessity is basic to both causation, and to the concept of nature
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
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15823
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Some propose a distinct 'agent causation', as well as 'event causation'
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26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 7. Strictness of Laws
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15820
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A 'law of nature' is just something which is physically necessary
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