Ideas from 'Psychosemantics' by Jerry A. Fodor [1987], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Psychosemantics' by Fodor,Jerry A. [MIT 1993,0-262-56052-6]].
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5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
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3005
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'Jocasta' needs to be distinguished from 'Oedipus's mother' because they are connected by different properties
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
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7014
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A particle and a coin heads-or-tails pick out to perfectly well-defined predicates and properties
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12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / a. Innate knowledge
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3009
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Sticklebacks have an innate idea that red things are rivals
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2990
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Contrary to commonsense, most of what is in the mind seems to be unlearned
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3008
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Evolution suggests that innate knowledge of human psychology would be beneficial
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15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / e. Questions about mind
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2994
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In CRTT thought may be represented, content must be
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15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
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15494
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We can't use propositions to explain intentional attitudes, because they would need explaining
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7326
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Intentionality doesn't go deep enough to appear on the physicists' ultimate list of things
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17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
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3001
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Behaviourism has no theory of mental causation
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17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 2. Machine Functionalism
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2993
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Any piece of software can always be hard-wired
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17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 4. Causal Functionalism
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3011
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Causal powers must be a crucial feature of mental states
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17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 6. Homuncular Functionalism
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5498
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Mind is a set of hierarchical 'homunculi', which are made up in turn from subcomponents [Lycan]
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17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
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2995
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Supervenience gives good support for mental causation
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 4. Connectionism
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2991
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Hume's associationism offers no explanation at all of rational thought
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
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3002
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If mind is just physical, how can it follow the rules required for intelligent thought?
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18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
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2992
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We may be able to explain rationality mechanically
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18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
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2988
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Folk psychology is the only explanation of behaviour we have
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18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
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3010
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Belief and desire are structured states, which need mentalese
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18. Thought / C. Content / 7. Narrow Content
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2999
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Obsession with narrow content leads to various sorts of hopeless anti-realism
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18. Thought / C. Content / 10. Causal Semantics
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3012
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Do identical thoughts have identical causal roles?
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 3. Meaning as Speaker's Intention
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2998
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Grice thinks meaning is inherited from the propositional attitudes which sentences express
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
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3006
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Whatever in the mind delivers falsehood is parasitic on what delivers truth
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
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3007
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Many different verification procedures can reach 'star', but it only has one semantic value
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
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3004
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The meaning of a sentence derives from its use in expressing an attitude
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
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3000
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Meaning holism is a crazy doctrine
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / c. Meaning by Role
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3003
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Very different mental states can share their contents, so content doesn't seem to be constructed from functional role
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 8. Synonymy
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2996
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Mental states may have the same content but different extensions
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