### Ideas from 'Function and Concept' by Gottlob Frege [1891], by Theme Structure

#### [found in 'Translations from the Writings of Gottlob Frege' by Frege,Gottlob (ed/tr Geach,P/Black,M) [Blackwell 1980,0-631-12911-1]].

green numbers give full details    |     back to texts     |     expand these ideas

###### 5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 5. Functions in Logic
 8490 First-level functions have objects as arguments; second-level functions take functions as arguments
###### 5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
 8492 Relations are functions with two arguments
###### 6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
 8487 Arithmetic is a development of logic, so arithmetical symbolism must expand into logical symbolism
###### 7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
 18899 Frege takes the existence of horses to be part of their concept [Sommers]
###### 8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
 4028 Frege allows either too few properties (as extensions) or too many (as predicates) [Mellor/Oliver]
###### 9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
 8489 The concept 'object' is too simple for analysis; unlike a function, it is an expression with no empty place
###### 18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
 9947 Concepts are the ontological counterparts of predicative expressions [George/Velleman]
 10319 An assertion about the concept 'horse' must indirectly speak of an object [Hale]
 8488 A concept is a function whose value is always a truth-value
###### 18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / a. Conceptual structure
 9948 Unlike objects, concepts are inherently incomplete [George/Velleman]
###### 19. Language / B. Reference / 5. Speaker's Reference
 4972 I may regard a thought about Phosphorus as true, and the same thought about Hesperus as false
###### 28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
 8491 The Ontological Argument fallaciously treats existence as a first-level concept