Ideas from 'A Plea for Substitutional Quantification' by Charles Parsons [1971], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Philosophy of Logic: an anthology' (ed/tr Jacquette,Dale) [Blackwell 2002,0-631-21868-8]].

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4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 4. Alethic Modal Logic

9470	Modal logic is not an extensional language

			Full Idea: Modal logic is not an extensional language.
			From: Charles Parsons (A Plea for Substitutional Quantification [1971], p.159 n8)
			A reaction: [I record this for investigation. Possible worlds seem to contain objects]

5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification

9468	On the substitutional interpretation, '(∃x) Fx' is true iff a closed term 't' makes Ft true

			Full Idea: For the substitutional interpretation of quantifiers, a sentence of the form '(∃x) Fx' is true iff there is some closed term 't' of the language such that 'Ft' is true. For the objectual interpretation some object x must exist such that Fx is true.
			From: Charles Parsons (A Plea for Substitutional Quantification [1971], p.156)
			A reaction: How could you decide if it was true for 't' if you didn't know what object 't' referred to?

9469	Substitutional existential quantifier may explain the existence of linguistic entities

			Full Idea: I argue (against Quine) that the existential quantifier substitutionally interpreted has a genuine claim to express a concept of existence, which may give the best account of linguistic abstract entities such as propositions, attributes, and classes.
			From: Charles Parsons (A Plea for Substitutional Quantification [1971], p.156)
			A reaction: Intuitively I have my doubts about this, since the whole thing sounds like a verbal and conventional game, rather than anything with a proper ontology. Ruth Marcus and Quine disagree over this one.