Ideas from 'Philosophy of Mathematics' by Stewart Shapiro [1997], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Philosophy of Mathematics:structure and ontology' by Shapiro,Stewart [OUP 1997,0-19-513930-5]].
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2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
10237
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Coherence is a primitive, intuitive notion, not reduced to something formal
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2. Reason / D. Definition / 7. Contextual Definition
10204
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An 'implicit definition' gives a direct description of the relations of an entity
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4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
10206
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Modal operators are usually treated as quantifiers
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4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
10208
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Axiom of Choice: some function has a value for every set in a given set
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10252
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The Axiom of Choice seems to license an infinite amount of choosing
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4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
10207
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Anti-realists reject set theory
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5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 2. Types of Consequence
10259
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The two standard explanations of consequence are semantic (in models) and deductive
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5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 5. Modus Ponens
10257
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Intuitionism only sanctions modus ponens if all three components are proved
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5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
10253
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Either logic determines objects, or objects determine logic, or they are separate
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5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
10251
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The law of excluded middle might be seen as a principle of omniscience
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5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
10212
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Classical connectives differ from their ordinary language counterparts; '∧' is timeless, unlike 'and'
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5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 5. Functions in Logic
10209
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A function is just an arbitrary correspondence between collections
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5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
10268
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Maybe plural quantifiers should be understood in terms of classes or sets
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5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 4. Satisfaction
10235
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A sentence is 'satisfiable' if it has a model
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5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
10239
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The central notion of model theory is the relation of 'satisfaction'
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10240
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Model theory deals with relations, reference and extensions
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5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 2. Isomorphisms
10238
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The set-theoretical hierarchy contains as many isomorphism types as possible
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10214
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Theory ontology is never complete, but is only determined 'up to isomorphism'
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5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 3. Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems
10234
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Any theory with an infinite model has a model of every infinite cardinality
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6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
10201
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Virtually all of mathematics can be modeled in set theory
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6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
10213
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Real numbers are thought of as either Cauchy sequences or Dedekind cuts
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18243
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Understanding the real-number structure is knowing usage of the axiomatic language of analysis
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6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / i. Reals from cuts
18245
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Cuts are made by the smallest upper or largest lower number, some of them not rational
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6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 1. Foundations for Mathematics
10236
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There is no grounding for mathematics that is more secure than mathematics
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6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 2. Proof in Mathematics
10256
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For intuitionists, proof is inherently informal
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6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
10202
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Natural numbers just need an initial object, successors, and an induction principle
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6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / b. Greek arithmetic
10205
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Mathematics originally concerned the continuous (geometry) and the discrete (arithmetic)
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6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / b. Mathematics is not set theory
10222
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Mathematical foundations may not be sets; categories are a popular rival
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6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
10218
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Baseball positions and chess pieces depend entirely on context
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10224
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The even numbers have the natural-number structure, with 6 playing the role of 3
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10228
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Could infinite structures be apprehended by pattern recognition?
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10230
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The 4-pattern is the structure common to all collections of four objects
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10249
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The main mathematical structures are algebraic, ordered, and topological
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10273
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Some structures are exemplified by both abstract and concrete
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10276
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Mathematical structures are defined by axioms, or in set theory
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6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / b. Varieties of structuralism
10270
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The main versions of structuralism are all definitionally equivalent
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6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / c. Nominalist structuralism
10221
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Is there is no more to structures than the systems that exemplify them?
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10248
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Number statements are generalizations about number sequences, and are bound variables
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6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / d. Platonist structuralism
10220
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Because one structure exemplifies several systems, a structure is a one-over-many
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10223
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There is no 'structure of all structures', just as there is no set of all sets
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8703
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Shapiro's structuralism says model theory (comparing structures) is the essence of mathematics [Friend]
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6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
10274
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Does someone using small numbers really need to know the infinite structure of arithmetic?
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6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
10200
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We distinguish realism 'in ontology' (for objects), and 'in truth-value' (for being either true or false)
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10210
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If mathematical objects are accepted, then a number of standard principles will follow
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10215
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Platonists claim we can state the essence of a number without reference to the others
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10233
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Platonism must accept that the Peano Axioms could all be false
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6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 2. Intuition of Mathematics
10244
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Intuition is an outright hindrance to five-dimensional geometry
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6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
10280
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A stone is a position in some pattern, and can be viewed as an object, or as a location
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6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / a. Constructivism
10254
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Can the ideal constructor also destroy objects?
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10255
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Presumably nothing can block a possible dynamic operation?
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7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
10279
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Can we discover whether a deck is fifty-two cards, or a person is time-slices or molecules?
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
10227
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The abstract/concrete boundary now seems blurred, and would need a defence
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10226
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Mathematicians regard arithmetic as concrete, and group theory as abstract
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 7. Fictionalism
10262
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Fictionalism eschews the abstract, but it still needs the possible (without model theory)
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10277
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Structuralism blurs the distinction between mathematical and ordinary objects
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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
10272
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The notion of 'object' is at least partially structural and mathematical
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
10275
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A blurry border is still a border
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10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
10258
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Logical modalities may be acceptable, because they are reducible to satisfaction in models
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
10266
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Why does the 'myth' of possible worlds produce correct modal logic?
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15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
10203
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We apprehend small, finite mathematical structures by abstraction from patterns
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18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
10229
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Simple types can be apprehended through their tokens, via abstraction
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18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
10217
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We can apprehend structures by focusing on or ignoring features of patterns
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9554
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We can focus on relations between objects (like baseballers), ignoring their other features
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18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
10231
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Abstract objects might come by abstraction over an equivalence class of base entities
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