Ideas from 'Science without Numbers' by Hartry Field [1980], by Theme Structure
		
		[found in 'Science without Number' by Field,Hartry  [Blackwell 1980,0-631-13037-3]].
		
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		4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
		
	
	
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			9570 
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    	In Field's Platonist view, set theory is false because it asserts existence for non-existent things [Chihara]  
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					5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
	            
            	       
	
	
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						 10260 
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			Logical consequence is defined by the impossibility of P and ¬q [Shapiro]  
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					6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
	            
            	       
	
	
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						 8958 
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			In Field's version of science, space-time points replace real numbers [Szabó]  
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					6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 3. Axioms for Geometry
	            
            	       
	
	
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						 18221 
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			'Metric' axioms uses functions, points and numbers; 'synthetic' axioms give facts about space
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					6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
	            
            	       
	
	
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						 8757 
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			The Indispensability Argument is the only serious ground for the existence of mathematical entities
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					6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 3. Mathematical Nominalism
	            
            	       
	
	
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						 18212 
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			Nominalists try to only refer to physical objects, or language, or mental constructions
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					6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / b. Indispensability of mathematics
	            
            	       
	
	
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						 10261 
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			The application of mathematics only needs its possibility, not its truth [Shapiro]  
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						 18218 
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			Hilbert explains geometry, by non-numerical facts about space
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						 9623 
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			Field needs a semantical notion of second-order consequence, and that needs sets [Brown,JR]  
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					6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
	            
            	       
	
	
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						 18215 
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			It seems impossible to explain the idea that the conclusion is contained in the premises
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					6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 9. Fictional Mathematics
	            
            	       
	
	
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						 18216 
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			Abstractions can form useful counterparts to concrete statements
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						 18214 
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			Mathematics is only empirical as regards which theory is useful
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						 18210 
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			Why regard standard mathematics as truths, rather than as interesting fictions?
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					7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
	            
            	       
	
	
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						 18211 
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			You can reduce ontological commitment by expanding the logic
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					8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
	            
            	       
	
	
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						 8959 
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			Field presumes properties can be eliminated from science [Szabó]  
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					9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / d. Problems with abstracta
	            
            	       
	
	
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						 18213 
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			Abstract objects are only applicable to the world if they are impure, and connect to the physical
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					14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
	            
            	       
	
	
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						 18222 
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			Beneath every extrinsic explanation there is an intrinsic explanation
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					18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 4. Abstracta by Example
	            
            	       
	
	
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						 9917 
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			'Abstract' is unclear, but numbers, functions and sets are clearly abstract
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					27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / b. Fields
	            
            	       
	
	
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						 18223 
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			In theories of fields, space-time points or regions are causal agents
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					27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 4. Substantival Space
	            
            	       
	
	
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						 18220 
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			Both philosophy and physics now make substantivalism more attractive
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					27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 5. Relational Space
	            
            	       
	
	
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						 18219 
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			Relational space is problematic if you take the idea of a field seriously
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