Ideas from 'Truth Rehabilitated' by Donald Davidson [1997], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Truth, Language and History' by Davidson,Donald [OUP 2005,0-19-823757-x]].
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3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
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Truth can't be a goal, because we can neither recognise it nor confim it
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Without truth, both language and thought are impossible
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Plato's Forms confused truth with the most eminent truths, so only Truth itself is completely true
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3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
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Correspondence can't be defined, but it shows how truth depends on the world
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3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
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When Tarski defines truth for different languages, how do we know it is a single concept?
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3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
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Disquotation only accounts for truth if the metalanguage contains the object language
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / e. Facts rejected
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If we try to identify facts precisely, they all melt into one (as the Slingshot Argument proves)
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
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Knowing the potential truth conditions of a sentence is necessary and sufficient for understanding
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
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It could be that the use of a sentence is explained by its truth conditions
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