Ideas from 'Truth and Truthmakers' by David M. Armstrong [2004], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Truth and Truthmakers' by Armstrong,D.M. [CUP 2004,0-521-54723-7]].
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1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
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18390
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All metaphysical discussion should be guided by a quest for truthmakers
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
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18467
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Truth-making can't be entailment, because truthmakers are portions of reality
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18468
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Armstrong says truthmakers necessitate their truth, where 'necessitate' is a primitive relation [MacBride]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 6. Making Negative Truths
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18377
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Negative truths have as truthmakers all states of affairs relevant to the truth
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18382
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The nature of arctic animals is truthmaker for the absence of penguins there
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 7. Making Modal Truths
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18384
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One truthmaker will do for a contingent truth and for its contradictory
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18394
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In mathematics, truthmakers are possible instantiations of structures
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18387
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The truthmakers for possible unicorns are the elements in their combination
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18386
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What is the truthmaker for 'it is possible that there could have been nothing'?
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 8. Making General Truths
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18381
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Necessitating general truthmakers must also specify their limits
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4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
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18396
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The set theory brackets { } assert that the member is a unit
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4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / b. Empty (Null) Set
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18393
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For 'there is a class with no members' we don't need the null set as truthmaker
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6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / a. Units
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18392
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Classes have cardinalities, so their members must all be treated as units
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / d. Logical atoms
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18385
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Logical atomism builds on the simple properties, but are they the only possible properties?
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 5. Naturalism
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18391
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'Naturalism' says only the world of space-time exists
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 9. States of Affairs
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18374
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Truthmaking needs states of affairs, to unite particulars with tropes or universals.
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 2. Need for Properties
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18372
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We need properties, as minimal truthmakers for the truths about objects
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
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18378
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Length is a 'determinable' property, and one mile is one its 'determinates'
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18379
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The determinates of a determinable must be incompatible with each other
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
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18373
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If tropes are non-transferable, then they necessarily belong to their particular substance
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8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
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18400
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Properties are not powers - they just have powers
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8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 7. Against Powers
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18397
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Powers must result in some non-powers, or there would only be potential without result
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18399
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How does the power of gravity know the distance it acts over?
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8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
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18371
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The class of similar things is much too big a truthmaker for the feature of a particular
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
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18389
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When entities contain entities, or overlap with them, there is 'partial' identity
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
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18388
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Possible worlds don't fix necessities; intrinsic necessities imply the extension in worlds
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15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
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18375
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General truths are a type of negative truth, saying there are no more ravens than black ones
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19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
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18368
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For all being, there is a potential proposition which expresses its existence and nature
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18370
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A realm of abstract propositions is causally inert, so has no explanatory value
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
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18380
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Negative causations supervene on positive causations plus their laws?
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27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / e. Present moment
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18401
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The pure present moment is too brief to be experienced
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