Ideas from 'General Semantics' by David Lewis [1970], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Philosophical Papers Vol.1' by Lewis,David [OUP 1983,0-19-503204-7]].

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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
Sentence meaning determines its truth-value in various situations
                        Full Idea: A meaning for a sentence is something that determines the conditions under which the sentence is true or false. It determines the truth-value of the sentence in various possible states of affairs.
                        From: David Lewis (General Semantics [1970], III)
                        A reaction: A somewhat clearer assertion of the view originating with Frege, and championed by Davidson. Meaning is a 'something', and so opposed to the nihilistic Kripkenstein view. I agree with Lewis on that. Meanings are mental states.