Ideas from 'Modality' by Joseph Melia [2003], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Modality' by Melia,Joseph [Acumen 2003,1-902683-48-x]].

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2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason

5750	Consistency is modal, saying propositions are consistent if they could be true together

4. Formal Logic / C. Predicate Calculus PC / 1. Predicate Calculus PC

5737	Predicate logic has connectives, quantifiers, variables, predicates, equality, names and brackets

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic

5744	First-order predicate calculus is extensional logic, but quantified modal logic is intensional (hence dubious)

5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification

5740	Second-order logic needs second-order variables and quantification into predicate position

5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models

5741	If every model that makes premises true also makes conclusion true, the argument is valid

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts

5735	Maybe names and predicates can capture any fact

5736	No sort of plain language or levels of logic can express modal facts properly

9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects

5746	The Identity of Indiscernibles is contentious for qualities, and trivial for non-qualities

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity

5738	We may be sure that P is necessary, but is it necessarily necessary?

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality

5732	'De re' modality is about things themselves, 'de dicto' modality is about propositions

10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility

5739	Sometimes we want to specify in what ways a thing is possible

10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds

5742	In possible worlds semantics the modal operators are treated as quantifiers

5743	If possible worlds semantics is not realist about possible worlds, logic becomes merely formal

5749	Possible worlds could be real as mathematics, propositions, properties, or like books

5734	Possible worlds make it possible to define necessity and counterfactuals without new primitives

10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / b. Worlds as fictions

5751	The truth of propositions at possible worlds are implied by the world, just as in books

19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification

5748	We accept unverifiable propositions because of simplicity, utility, explanation and plausibility