Ideas from 'Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd)' by J Pollock / J Cruz [1999], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Contemporary Theories of Knowledge (2nd)' by Pollock,J.L./Cruz,J [Rowman and Littlefield 1999,0-8476-8937-9]].

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11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge

6346	The main epistemological theories are foundationalist, coherence, probabilistic and reliabilist

11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty

6351	Most people now agree that our reasoning proceeds defeasibly, rather than deductively

6374	To believe maximum truths, believe everything; to have infallible beliefs, believe nothing

11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism

6355	Direct realism says justification is partly a function of pure perceptual states, not of beliefs

11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism

6359	Phenomenalism offered conclusive perceptual knowledge, but conclusive reasons no longer seem essential

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception

6366	Perception causes beliefs in us, without inference or justification

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception

6362	Sense evidence is not beliefs, because they are about objective properties, not about appearances

13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues

6371	Bayesian epistemology is Bayes' Theorem plus the 'simple rule' (believe P if it is probable)

13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism

6373	Internalism says if anything external varies, the justifiability of the belief does not vary

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs

6353	People rarely have any basic beliefs, and never enough for good foundations

6361	Foundationalism requires self-justification, not incorrigibility

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / d. Rational foundations

6357	Reason cannot be an ultimate foundation, because rational justification requires prior beliefs

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique

6363	Foundationalism is wrong, because either all beliefs are prima facie justified, or none are

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification

6365	Negative coherence theories do not require reasons, so have no regress problem

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique

6354	Coherence theories fail, because they can't accommodate perception as the basis of knowledge

6367	Coherence theories isolate justification from the world

13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification

6370	Externalism comes as 'probabilism' (probability of truth) and 'reliabilism' (probability of good cognitive process)

13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification

6358	One belief may cause another, without being the basis for the second belief

13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique

6364	We can't start our beliefs from scratch, because we wouldn't know where to start

14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction

6352	Enumerative induction gives a universal judgement, while statistical induction gives a proportion

14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem

6372	Since every tautology has a probability of 1, should we believe all tautologies?

14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / a. Best explanation

6360	Scientific confirmation is best viewed as inference to the best explanation