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| 8808 | Involuntary beliefs can still be evaluated |
| Full Idea: Examples confirm that beliefs may be both involuntary and subject to epistemic evaluation. | |||
| From: R Feldman / E Conee (Evidentialism [1985], II) | |||
| A reaction: This is an extremely important point, which summarises the situation with beliefs that arise from (apparent) immediate perception. A belief cannot possibly be knowledge if it has been triggered, but no effort was made to evaluate it. |
| 8807 | Evidentialism is the view that justification is determined by the quality of the evidence |
| Full Idea: What we call 'evidentialism' is the view that the epistemic justification of a belief is determined by the quality of the believer's evidence for the belief. | |||
| From: R Feldman / E Conee (Evidentialism [1985], I) | |||
| A reaction: The immediate question is whether the believer knows the quality of their evidence. A detective might not recognise the crucial clue (like the dog not barking). The definition of 'quality' had better not turn out to be circular. Forgotten evidence? |
| 8809 | Beliefs should fit evidence, and if you ought to believe it, then you are justified |
| Full Idea: One epistemically ought to have the doxastic attitudes that fit one's evidence. Being epistemically obligatory is equivalent to being epistemically justified. | |||
| From: R Feldman / E Conee (Evidentialism [1985], III) | |||
| A reaction: It is normal for someone to refuse to accept something, when another person believes the evidence is overwhelming. Evaluation of evidence must include an assessment of what other evidence might turn up. |
| 8810 | If someone rejects good criticism through arrogance, that is irrelevant to whether they have knowledge |
| Full Idea: If an arrogant young physicist refuses to recognise valid criticisms from a senior colleague, his or her character has nothing to do with the epistemic status of their belief in the theory. | |||
| From: R Feldman / E Conee (Evidentialism [1985], III) | |||
| A reaction: This rejects the idea that epistemic justification is essentially a matter of virtues and vices of character. That view is a version of reliabilism, and hence of externalism. I agree with the criticism, but epistemic virtues are still significant. |