Ideas from 'Philosophy of Science' by Alexander Bird [1998], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Philosophy of Science' by Bird,Alexander [UCL Press 2000,1-85728-504-2]].
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1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 1. Aims of Science
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6779
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Instrumentalists say distinctions between observation and theory vanish with ostensive definition
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
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6780
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Anti-realism is more plausible about laws than about entities and theories
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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 6. Probability
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6796
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Subjective probability measures personal beliefs; objective probability measures the chance of an event happening
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6797
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Objective probability of tails measures the bias of the coin, not our beliefs about it
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13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
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6800
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Many philosophers rate justification as a more important concept than knowledge
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
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6786
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As science investigates more phenomena, the theories it needs decreases
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14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 1. Observation
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6792
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If theories need observation, and observations need theories, how do we start?
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14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
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6757
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Explanation predicts after the event; prediction explains before the event
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14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
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6805
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Relativity ousted Newtonian mechanics despite a loss of simplicity
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6777
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Realists say their theories involve truth and the existence of their phenomena
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6804
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There is no agreement on scientific method - because there is no such thing
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14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
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6778
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Instrumentalists regard theories as tools for prediction, with truth being irrelevant
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14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction
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6775
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Induction is inference to the best explanation, where the explanation is a law
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14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
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6790
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Anything justifying inferences from observed to unobserved must itself do that
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6791
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If Hume is right about induction, there is no scientific knowledge
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14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
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6738
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Any conclusion can be drawn from an induction, if we use grue-like predicates
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6739
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Several months of observing beech trees supports the deciduous and evergreen hypotheses
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6799
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We normally learn natural kinds from laws, but Goodman shows laws require prior natural kinds
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14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
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6798
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Bayesianism claims to find rationality and truth in induction, and show how science works
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
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6752
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The objective component of explanations is the things that must exist for the explanation
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6754
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We talk both of 'people' explaining things, and of 'facts' explaining things
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
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6750
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Explanations are causal, nomic, psychological, psychoanalytic, Darwinian or functional
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / b. Contrastive explanations
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6761
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Contrastive explanations say why one thing happened but not another
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
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6758
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'Covering law' explanations only work if no other explanations are to be found
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6759
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Livers always accompany hearts, but they don't explain hearts
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / l. Probabilistic explanations
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6756
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Probabilistic-statistical explanations don't entail the explanandum, but makes it more likely
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6760
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An operation might reduce the probability of death, yet explain a death
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / a. Best explanation
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6785
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Inference to the Best Explanation is done with facts, so it has to be realist
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / c. Against best explanation
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6788
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Maybe bad explanations are the true ones, in this messy world
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6787
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Which explanation is 'best' is bound to be subjective, and no guide to truth
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 4. Explanation Doubts / a. Explanation as pragmatic
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6751
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Maybe explanation is so subjective that it cannot be a part of science
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26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
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6776
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Natural kinds are those that we use in induction
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6768
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Tin is not one natural kind, but appears to be 21, depending on isotope
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6770
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Membership of a purely random collection cannot be used as an explanation
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6771
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Natural kinds may overlap, or be sub-kinds of one another
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6767
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Rubies and sapphires are both corundum, with traces of metals varying their colours
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26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 2. Defining Kinds
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6773
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If F is a universal appearing in a natural law, then Fs form a natural kind
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26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 3. Knowing Kinds
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6769
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In the Kripke-Putnam view only nuclear physicists can know natural kinds
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6774
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Darwinism suggests that we should have a native ability to detect natural kinds
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26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 5. Reference to Natural Kinds
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6764
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Nominal essence of a natural kind is the features that make it fit its name
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6766
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Jadeite and nephrite are superficially identical, but have different composition
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6808
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Reference to scientific terms is by explanatory role, not by descriptions
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
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6753
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Laws are more fundamental in science than causes, and laws will explain causes
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26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
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6762
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Newton's laws cannot be confirmed individually, but only in combinations
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6763
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Parapsychology is mere speculation, because it offers no mechanisms for its working
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6772
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Existence requires laws, as inertia or gravity are needed for mass or matter
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26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
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6746
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There may be many laws, each with only a few instances
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6740
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'All uranium lumps are small' is a law, but 'all gold lumps are small' is not
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6741
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There can be remarkable uniformities in nature that are purely coincidental
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6742
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A law might have no instances, if it was about things that only exist momentarily
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6743
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If laws are just instances, the law should either have gaps, or join the instances arbitrarily
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6744
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Where is the regularity in a law predicting nuclear decay?
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6747
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Laws cannot explain instances if they are regularities, as something can't explain itself
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6748
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Similar appearance of siblings is a regularity, but shared parents is what links them
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6749
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We can only infer a true regularity if something binds the instances together
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6803
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If we only infer laws from regularities among observations, we can't infer unobservable entities.
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6801
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Accidental regularities are not laws, and an apparent regularity may not be actual
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26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / b. Best system theory
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6745
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A regularity is only a law if it is part of a complete system which is simple and strong
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6802
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With strange enough predicates, anything could be made out to be a regularity
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26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / d. Knowing essences
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6789
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If flame colour is characteristic of a metal, that is an empirical claim needing justification
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27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / d. Mass
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6807
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In Newton mass is conserved, but in Einstein it can convert into energy
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