Ideas from 'Principia Ethica' by G.E. Moore [1903], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Principia Ethica' by Moore,G.E. [CUP 1980,0-521-09114-4]].
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21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
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The beautiful is whatever it is intrinsically good to admire
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
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Moore tries to show that 'good' is indefinable, but doesn't understand what a definition is [MacIntyre]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / a. Idealistic ethics
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The Open Question argument leads to anti-realism and the fact-value distinction [Boulter]
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Moore cannot show why something being good gives us a reason for action [MacIntyre]
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The naturalistic fallacy claims that natural qualties can define 'good'
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Can learning to recognise a good friend help us to recognise a good watch? [MacIntyre]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
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Moore's combination of antinaturalism with strong supervenience on the natural is incoherent [Hanna]
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Despite Moore's caution, non-naturalists incline towards intuitionism [Smith,M]
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22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
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We should ask what we would judge to be good if it existed in absolute isolation
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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
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It is always an open question whether anything that is natural is good
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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
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The three main values are good, right and beauty [Ross]
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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / c. Right and good
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For Moore, 'right' is what produces good [Ross]
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'Right' means 'cause of good result' (hence 'useful'), so the end does justify the means
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23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
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Relationships imply duties to people, not merely the obligation to benefit them [Ross]
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