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| 4568 | If 'Queen of England' does not refer if there is no queen, its meaning can't refer if there is one |
| Full Idea: If 'the Queen of England' is not a referring expression when there is no queen, nor can it be one when there is a queen - since the meaning of the expression is the same in either case. | |||
| From: David E. Cooper (Philosophy and the Nature of Language [1973], §4.1) | |||
| A reaction: I'm not convinced. Does this mean that since I can point with my finger at nothing, I therefore do not indicate anything when there is an object at which I am pointing. Sounds silly to me. |
| 4574 | If some peoples do not have categories like time or cause, they can't be essential features of rationality |
| Full Idea: If our most basic concepts, like time, space, substance or causality, are not shared by some peoples, it puts paid to the cherished ideal of philosophers to discover a set of concepts or categories which any rational human must employ in his thinking. | |||
| From: David E. Cooper (Philosophy and the Nature of Language [1973], §5.2) | |||
| A reaction: This seems to be a place where a priori philosophy (Aristotle,Kant,Hegel) meets empirical research (Whorf). However, interpreting the research is so fraught with problems it drives you back to the a priori… |
| 4573 | If it is claimed that language correlates with culture, we must be able to identify the two independently |
| Full Idea: If it is claimed that linguistic differences significantly correlate with cultural differences, it must therefore be possible to identify the linguistic differences independently from the cultural ones. | |||
| From: David E. Cooper (Philosophy and the Nature of Language [1973], §5.1) | |||
| A reaction: This is a basic objection to any extreme relativist version of the S-P hypothesis. They are part of the conspiracy to overemphasise language in philosophy, and they are wrong. |
| 4575 | A person's language doesn't prove their concepts, but how are concepts deduced apart from language? |
| Full Idea: It would be absurd to say the Hopi lack the concept of time because they lack tensed verbs, ..but how do we find out what a man's concepts are except in terms of his language? | |||
| From: David E. Cooper (Philosophy and the Nature of Language [1973], §5.2) | |||
| A reaction: Presumably we should look at animals, where concepts must be inferred in order to explain behaviour. I don't see why introspection (scientifically wicked) should not also be employed to detect our own non-verbal concepts. How are new words invented? |
| 4561 | Many sentences set up dispositions which are irrelevant to the meanings of the sentences |
| Full Idea: Many sentences set up dispositions which are irrelevant to the meanings of the sentences. | |||
| From: David E. Cooper (Philosophy and the Nature of Language [1973], §2.3) | |||
| A reaction: Yet another telling objection to behaviourism. When I look at broccoli I may have a disposition to be sick, but that isn't part of the concept of broccoli. |
| 4564 | I can meaningfully speculate that humans may have experiences currently impossible for us |
| Full Idea: It is not meaningless for me to postulate the potential for humans to sense in a manner which is at present unimaginable and indescribable. There is no reason to believe me, but I might be right. | |||
| From: David E. Cooper (Philosophy and the Nature of Language [1973], §3.1) | |||
| A reaction: The key counterexample to verificationist theories of meaning is wild speculations, which are clearly meaningful, though frequently far beyond any likely human experience. Logical positivists are allergic to imagination. |
| 4565 | The verification principle itself seems neither analytic nor verifiable |
| Full Idea: It seems that the positivists must admit that there is at least one statement which is meaningful, but which is neither verifiable nor analytic - namely, the statement of the principle of verification itself. | |||
| From: David E. Cooper (Philosophy and the Nature of Language [1973], §3.1) | |||
| A reaction: Some people think this objection is decisive, but I think any theory must be permitted a few metatheoretic assertions or axioms which are beyond discussion. Ayer thought the VP might be treated as analytic. Everyone has to start somewhere. |
| 4562 | Most people know how to use the word "Amen", but they do not know what it means |
| Full Idea: Most people know how to use the word "Amen", but they do not know what it means. | |||
| From: David E. Cooper (Philosophy and the Nature of Language [1973], §2.4) | |||
| A reaction: Personally I find examples like this decisive against the 'use' theory of meaning. Maybe the defence is that the theory works for sentences, and individual words (like passwords) are peripheral. |
| 4563 | 'How now brown cow?' is used for elocution, but this says nothing about its meaning |
| Full Idea: The sentence 'How now brown cow?' has its use in elocutions classes, yet this aspect of its use tells us nothing about its meaning. | |||
| From: David E. Cooper (Philosophy and the Nature of Language [1973], §2.4) | |||
| A reaction: Indeed, and also there are weird sentence of which we can assemble a meaning, but cannot think of any conceivable use ('rats swim in purple marmalade'). |
| 4566 | Any thesis about reference is also a thesis about what exists to be referred to |
| Full Idea: Any thesis about reference is also going to be a thesis about what there is in existence to refer to. | |||
| From: David E. Cooper (Philosophy and the Nature of Language [1973], §4) | |||
| A reaction: I see the point, but we must not put the cart before the horse. I may have an intuition that something exists, but not know how to refer to it (because of my small vocabulary). |
| 4571 | Reference need not be a hit-or-miss affair |
| Full Idea: Reference need not be a hit-or-miss affair. | |||
| From: David E. Cooper (Philosophy and the Nature of Language [1973], §4.2) | |||
| A reaction: Sounds right. If the basic scenario is picking someone out in a crowd, your listener may think they know which person you are talking about, with a high degree of probability. |
| 4572 | If predicates name things, that reduces every sentence to a mere list of names |
| Full Idea: If predicates are names of entities, then subject/predicate sentences are pairs of names, since subjects are names (or referring expressions). But a pair of names is not a sentence at all, it is a mere list. | |||
| From: David E. Cooper (Philosophy and the Nature of Language [1973], §4.4) | |||
| A reaction: If that is meant to demolish universals it is too quick. Concatenating names is not the same as listing them. A relationship is asserted. There is a (mysterious) Platonic 'partaking' between form and particular. Perhaps. |
| 4576 | An analytic truth is one which becomes a logical truth when some synonyms have been replaced |
| Full Idea: The definition of analytic truth which has, I believe, the most chance of success is one in terms of synonymy; ..an analytic truth is one which can be transformed into a logical truth once synonyms are replaced by synonyms. | |||
| From: David E. Cooper (Philosophy and the Nature of Language [1973], §7.1) | |||
| A reaction: Sounds promising, though there is Quine's notorious problem of circularity in all these concepts. If synonymy is conventional, then so is analyticity. I personally feel that the circle can be broken. |