Ideas from 'Consciousness Explained' by Daniel C. Dennett [1991], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Consciousness Explained' by Dennett,Daniel C. [Penguin 1993,0-14-012867]].
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8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
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We can bring dispositions into existence, as in creating an identifier [Mumford]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence
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Words are fixed by being attached to similarity clusters, without mention of 'essences'
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12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / b. Primary/secondary
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Light wavelengths entering the eye are only indirectly related to object colours
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14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
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Brains are essentially anticipation machines
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15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
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We can't draw a clear line between conscious and unconscious
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Perhaps the brain doesn't 'fill in' gaps in consciousness if no one is looking.
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15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness
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Conscious events can only be explained in terms of unconscious events
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15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 3. Privacy
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We can know a lot of what it is like to be a bat, and nothing important is unknown
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15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia
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"Qualia" can be replaced by complex dispositional brain states
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15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 6. Inverted Qualia
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We can't assume that dispositions will remain normal when qualia have been inverted
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15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 7. Blindsight
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In peripheral vision we see objects without their details, so blindsight is not that special
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Blindsight subjects glean very paltry information
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16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
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People accept blurred boundaries in many things, but insist self is All or Nothing
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16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / c. Self as brain controller
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The psychological self is an abstraction, not a thing in the brain
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16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 2. Self as Social Construct
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Selves are not soul-pearls, but artefacts of social processes
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16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 3. Narrative Self
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We spin narratives about ourselves, and the audience posits a centre of gravity for them
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We tell stories about ourselves, to protect, control and define who we are
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16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
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The brain is controlled by shifting coalitions, guided by good purposeful habits
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17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism
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If an epiphenomenon has no physical effects, it has to be undetectable
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17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
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Dualism wallows in mystery, and to accept it is to give up
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17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 6. Homuncular Functionalism
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All functionalism is 'homuncular', of one grain size or another
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
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Visual experience is composed of neural activity, which we find pleasing
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It is arbitrary to say which moment of brain processing is conscious
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26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / b. Limited purposes
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Originally there were no reasons, purposes or functions; since there were no interests, there were only causes
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