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Ideas from 'Protagoras' by Plato [391 BCE], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Complete Works' by Plato (ed/tr Cooper,John M.) [Hackett 1997,0-87220-349-2]].

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2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 4. Contraries
192 Only one thing can be contrary to something
                        Full Idea: To everything that admits of a contrary there is one contrary and no more.
                        From: Plato (Protagoras [c.391 BCE], 332c)
                        A reaction: The sort of thing for which a modern philosopher would demand a proof (and then reject when the proof couldn't be found), where a Greek is happy to assert it as self-evident. I can't think of a counterexample.
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / c. Self-predication
190 If asked whether justice itself is just or unjust, you would have to say that it is just
                        Full Idea: If someone asked me 'Is justice itself just or unjust?' I should answer that it was just, wouldn't you? I agree.
                        From: Plato (Protagoras [c.391 BCE], 330c)
                        A reaction: This is the commitment to self-predication which gets him into trouble. The beautiful is beautiful, but in what way? The true is true, but true of what? How small is the small?
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 3. Value of Knowledge
20184 The only real evil is loss of knowledge
                        Full Idea: The only real kind of faring ill is the loss of knowledge.
                        From: Plato (Protagoras [c.391 BCE], 345b)
                        A reaction: This must crucially involve the intellectualist view (of Socrates) that virtuos behaviour results from knowledge, and moral wickedness is the result of ignorance. It is hard to see how forgetting a phone number is evil.
20185 The most important things in life are wisdom and knowledge
                        Full Idea: It would be shameful indeed to say that wisdom and knowledge are anything but the most powerful forces in human activity.
                        From: Plato (Protagoras [c.391 BCE], 352d)
                        A reaction: He lumps wisdom and knowledge together, and I think we can take 'knowledge' to mean something like understanding, because obviously mere atomistic propositional knowledge can be utterly trivial.
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 7. Seeing Resemblance
191 Everything resembles everything else up to a point
                        Full Idea: Everything resembles everything else up to a point.
                        From: Plato (Protagoras [c.391 BCE], 331d)
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
203 Courage is knowing what should or shouldn't be feared
                        Full Idea: Knowledge of what is and is not to be feared is courage.
                        From: Plato (Protagoras [c.391 BCE], 360d)
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / j. Evil
202 No one willingly and knowingly embraces evil
                        Full Idea: No one willingly goes to meet evil, or what he thinks is evil.
                        From: Plato (Protagoras [c.391 BCE], 358d)
                        A reaction: Presumably people who actively choose satanism can override this deep-seated attitude. But their adherence to evil usually seems to be rather restrained. A danger of tautology with ideas like this.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / h. Good as benefit
193 Some things are good even though they are not beneficial to men
                        Full Idea: 'Do you mean by good those things that are beneficial to men?' 'Not only those. I call some things which are not beneficial good as well'.
                        From: Plato (Protagoras [c.391 BCE], 333e)
                        A reaction: Examples needed, but this would be bad news for utilitarians. Good health is not seen as beneficial if it is taken for granted. Not being deaf.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
197 Some pleasures are not good, and some pains are not evil
                        Full Idea: There are some pleasures which are not good, and some pains which are not evil.
                        From: Plato (Protagoras [c.391 BCE], 351d)
                        A reaction: Sadism and child birth. Though Bentham (I think) says that there is nothing good about the pain, since the event would obviously be better without it.
200 People tend only to disapprove of pleasure if it leads to pain, or prevents future pleasure
                        Full Idea: The only reason the common man disapproves of pleasures is if they lead to pain and deprive us of future pleasures.
                        From: Plato (Protagoras [c.391 BCE], 354a)
                        A reaction: Plato has a strong sense that some pleasures are just innately depraved and wicked. If those pleasure don't hurt anyone, it is very hard to pinpoint what is wrong with them.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / d. Teaching virtue
204 Socrates is contradicting himself in claiming virtue can't be taught, but that it is knowledge
                        Full Idea: Socrates is contradicting himself by saying virtue is not teachable, and yet trying to demonstrate that every virtue is knowledge.
                        From: Plato (Protagoras [c.391 BCE], 361b)
188 Socrates: I do not believe virtue can be taught
                        Full Idea: Socrates: I do not believe that virtue can be taught.
                        From: Plato (Protagoras [c.391 BCE], 320b)
189 If we punish wrong-doers, it shows that we believe virtue can be taught
                        Full Idea: Athenians inflict punishment on wrong-doers, which shows that they too think it possible to impart and teach goodness.
                        From: Plato (Protagoras [c.391 BCE], 324c)