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| 1922 | Spiritual qualities only become advantageous with the growth of wisdom |
| Full Idea: If virtue is a beneficial attribute of spirit, it must be wisdom; for spiritual qualities are not in themselves advantageous, but become so with wisdom…..Hence men cannot be good by nature. | |||
| From: Plato (Meno [c.376 BCE], 88c) | |||
| A reaction: Personally I haven't got any 'spiritual qualities', so I don't really understand this. |
| 11259 | How can you seek knowledge of something if you don't know it? |
| Full Idea: How will you aim to search for something you do not know at all? If you should meet with it, how will you know that this is the thing that you did not know? | |||
| From: Plato (Meno [c.376 BCE], 80d) | |||
| A reaction: Vasilis Politis cites this as a nice example of the 'aporiai' (puzzles) which Aristotle said were the foundation of enquiry. Nowadays the problem is called the 'paradox of enquiry'. |
| 24284 | We want the character which makes all bees the same, or all virtues somehow the same |
| Full Idea: Insofar as they are bees, they don't differ from one another at all. So what is that character in respect of which they don't differ at all? Similarly with virtues: if they are various, they all have some common character which makes them virtues. | |||
| From: Plato (Meno [c.376 BCE], 72b) | |||
| A reaction: This implies the classic view, that an essence is what makes something belong to its kind. I defend the individual essence of each bee. Bees seem identical to us, but not to other bees. |
| 20219 | True opinions only become really valuable when they are tied down by reasons |
| Full Idea: True opinions are a fine thing and all they do is good, …but they escape from a man's mind, so they are not worth much until one ties them down by (giving) an account of the reason why. | |||
| From: Plato (Meno [c.376 BCE], 98a) | |||
| A reaction: This gives justification the role of guarantee, stabilising and securing true beliefs (rather than triggering some new thing called 'knowledge'). |
| 5985 | Seeking and learning are just recollection |
| Full Idea: Seeking and learning are in fact nothing but recollection. | |||
| From: Plato (Meno [c.376 BCE], 81d) | |||
| A reaction: This is a prelude to the famous conversation with the slave boy about geometry. You don't have to follow Plato into the doctrine of reincarnation; this remark is a key slogan for all rationalists. As pupils in maths lessons, we pull knowledge from within. |
| 5986 | The slave boy learns geometry from questioning, not teaching, so it is recollection |
| Full Idea: The slave boy's knowledge of geometry will not come from teaching but from questioning; he will recover it for himself, and the spontaneous recovery of knowledge that is in him is recollection. | |||
| From: Plato (Meno [c.376 BCE], 85d) | |||
| A reaction: Of course, if maths and geometry are huge tautological axiom systems, we would expect to be able to derive them (with hints from a teacher) entirely from their axioms. It is not clear why we might be able to derive the truths of all nature a priori. |
| 1923 | As a guide to action, true opinion is as good as knowledge |
| Full Idea: True opinion is as good a guide as knowledge for the purpose of acting rightly. | |||
| From: Plato (Meno [c.376 BCE], 97b) | |||
| A reaction: This is the germ of Peirce's epistemology - that knowledge is an interesting theoretical concept, but opinion/belief is what matters, and most needs explanation. |
| 1919 | You don't need to learn what you know, and how do you seek for what you don't know? |
| Full Idea: You could argue that a man cannot discover what he does know or what he doesn't. The first needs no discovery, and how do you begin looking for the second? | |||
| From: Plato (Meno [c.376 BCE], 80e) |
| 1927 | It seems that virtue is neither natural nor taught, but is a divine gift |
| Full Idea: If our discussion is right, virtue is acquired neither by nature nor by teaching. Whoever has it gets it by divine dispensation, without taking thought. | |||
| From: Plato (Meno [c.376 BCE], 99e) |
| 1913 | Is virtue taught, or achieved by practice, or a natural aptitude, or what? |
| Full Idea: Is virtue something that can be taught, or does it come by practice, or is it a natural aptitude, or something else? | |||
| From: Plato (Meno [c.376 BCE], 70a) |
| 1921 | If virtue is a type of knowledge then it ought to be taught |
| Full Idea: If virtue is some sort of knowledge, then clearly it could be taught. | |||
| From: Plato (Meno [c.376 BCE], 87c) |
| 1916 | Even if virtues are many and various, they must have something in common to make them virtues |
| Full Idea: Even if virtues are many and various, at least they all have some common character which makes them all virtues. | |||
| From: Plato (Meno [c.376 BCE], 72c) |
| 1918 | How can you know part of virtue without knowing the whole? |
| Full Idea: Does anyone know what a part of virtue is without knowing the whole? | |||
| From: Plato (Meno [c.376 BCE], 79c) |