Ideas from 'Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals' by Immanuel Kant [1785], by Theme Structure
[found in 'The Moral Law (Groundwork of Morals)' by Kant,Immanuel (ed/tr Paton,H.J.) [Hutchinson 1948,0-09-036033-8]].
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1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
3722
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Metaphysics goes beyond the empirical, so doesn't need examples
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2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
3738
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The hallmark of rationality is setting itself an end
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12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
3726
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The categorical imperative is a practical synthetic a priori proposition
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
3739
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Free will is a kind of causality which works independently of other causes
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
3741
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We shall never be able to comprehend how freedom is possible
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
3740
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We cannot conceive of reason as being externally controlled
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
5296
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Kant made the political will into a pure self-determined "free" will [Marx/Engels]
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18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / c. Role of emotions
24011
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Kant thought emotions are too random and passive to be part of morality [Williams,B]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
5074
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Kant united religion and philosophy, by basing obedience to law on reason instead of faith [Taylor,R]
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8024
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The categorical imperative says nothing about what our activities and ends should be [MacIntyre]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
22390
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Kant thought human nature was pure hedonism, so virtue is only possible via the categorical imperative [Foot]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
9750
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We must only value what others find acceptable [Korsgaard]
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22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
20160
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Kant focuses exclusively on human values, and neglects cultural and personal values [Kekes]
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22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
9749
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Our rational choices confer value, arising from the sense that we ourselves are important [Korsgaard]
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7671
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Values are created by human choices, and are not some intrinsic quality, out there [Berlin]
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22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
3717
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Reverence is awareness of a value which demolishes my self-love
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3720
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We may claim noble motives, but we cannot penetrate our secret impulses
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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
3712
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A good will is not good because of what it achieves
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3725
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The good of an action is in the mind of the doer, not the consequences
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23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 2. Golden Rule
3733
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The 'golden rule' cannot be a universal law as it implies no duties
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23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
3736
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Virtue lets a rational being make universal law, and share in the kingdom of ends
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23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique
3544
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Kant thinks virtue becomes passive, and hence morally unaccountable [Annas]
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23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / f. Compassion
7674
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Generosity and pity are vices, because they falsely imply one person's superiority to another [Berlin]
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23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / h. Respect
21029
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Kantian respect is for humanity and reason (not from love or sympathy or solidarity) [Sandel]
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23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
7105
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If 'maxims' are deeper underlying intentions, Kant can be read as a virtue theorist [Statman]
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7625
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We can ask how rational goodness is, but also why is rationality good [Putnam]
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4024
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Kant follows Rousseau in defining freedom and morality in terms of each other [Taylor,C]
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3710
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The only purely good thing is a good will
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3715
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Other causes can produce nice results, so morality must consist in the law, found only in rational beings
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3737
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The will is good if its universalised maxim is never in conflict with itself
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20715
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It is basic that moral actions must be done from duty
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23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
3724
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A categorical imperative sees an action as necessary purely for its own sake
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3723
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There are no imperatives for a holy will, as the will is in harmony with moral law
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3735
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Men are subject to laws which are both self-made and universal
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3714
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Dutiful actions are judged not by purpose, but by the maxim followed
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3718
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Telling the truth from duty is quite different from doing so to avoid inconvenience
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5295
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Kant was happy with 'good will', even if it had no result [Marx/Engels]
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6695
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Kant has to attribute high moral worth to some deeply unattractive human lives [Graham]
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8028
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Kantian duty seems to imply conformism with authority [MacIntyre]
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23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
8026
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Almost any precept can be consistently universalized [MacIntyre]
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23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
4413
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The categorical imperative smells of cruelty [Nietzsche]
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3719
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If lying were the universal law it would make promises impossible
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3716
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Act according to a maxim you can will as a universal law
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3762
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Why couldn't all rational beings accept outrageously immoral rules of conduct? [Mill]
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3727
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Act as if your maxim were to become a universal law of nature
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15673
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The intuition behind the categorical imperative is that one ought not to make an exception of oneself [Finlayson]
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8068
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Universalising a maxim needs to first stipulate the right description for the action [Anscombe]
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8025
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The categorical imperative will not suggest maxims suitable for testing [MacIntyre]
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8027
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I can universalize a selfish maxim, if it is expressed in a way that only applies to me [MacIntyre]
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3728
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Suicide, false promises, neglected talent, and lack of charity all involve contradictions of principle [PG]
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22008
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Always treat yourself and others as an end, and never simply as a means
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22009
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Morality is the creation of the laws that enable a Kingdom of Ends
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23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 5. Persons as Ends
22050
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The maxim of an action is chosen, and not externally imposed [Bowie]
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3731
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Rational beings necessarily conceive their own existence as an end in itself
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6694
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Always treat humanity as an end and never as a means only
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23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 6. Motivation for Duty
4345
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For Kant, even a person who lacks all sympathy for others still has a motive for benevolence [Hursthouse]
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3711
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Only a good will makes us worthy of happiness
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4251
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If we are required to give moral thought the highest priority, this gives morality no content [Williams,B]
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16004
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If Kant lives by self-administered laws, this is as feeble as self-administered punishments [Kierkegaard]
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4344
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Actions where people spread happiness because they enjoy it have no genuine moral worth
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3713
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The function of reason is to produce a good will
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3729
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Our inclinations are not innately desirable; in fact most rational beings would like to be rid of them
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24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / c. Natural rights
3732
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Rational beings have a right to share in the end of an action, not just be part of the means
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25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 4. Free market
7670
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Kant is the father of the notion of exploitation as an evil [Berlin]
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25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / c. Natural law
7591
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Kant completed Grotius's project of a non-religious basis for natural law [Scruton]
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25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / b. Retribution for crime
7673
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Retributive punishment is better than being sent to hospital for your crimes [Berlin]
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25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
3730
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Non-rational beings only have a relative value, as means rather than as ends
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28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / b. Euthyphro question
8046
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We can only know we should obey God if we already have moral standards for judging God [MacIntyre]
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3721
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We judge God to be good by a priori standards of moral perfection
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28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / c. Moral Argument
20714
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God is not proved by reason, but is a postulate of moral thinking [Davies,B]
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