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Ideas from 'Physics' by Aristotle [337 BCE], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Physics' by Aristotle (ed/tr Waterfield,Robin) [OUP 1996,0-19-282310-8]].

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2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
5082 Reason grasps generalities, while the senses grasp particulars
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
13270 Are a part and whole one or many? Either way, what is the cause?
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
9790 Geometry studies naturally occurring lines, but not as they occur in nature
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
22962 Two is the least number, but there is no least magnitude, because it is always divisible
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
18090 Without infinity time has limits, magnitudes are indivisible, and numbers come to an end
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / c. Potential infinite
22929 Aristotle's infinity is a property of the counting process, that it has no natural limit [Le Poidevin]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / j. Infinite divisibility
22930 Lengths do not contain infinite parts; parts are created by acts of division [Le Poidevin]
18833 A continuous line cannot be composed of indivisible points
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
9974 Ten sheep and ten dogs are the same numerically, but it is not the same ten
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 4. Abstract Existence
5105 The incommensurability of the diagonal always exists, and so it is not in time
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
22960 The sophists thought a man in the Lyceum is different from that man in the marketplace
16115 Change is the implied actuality of that which exists potentially
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / c. Grounding and explanation
17262 Aristotle's formal and material 'becauses' [aitiai] arguably involve grounding [Correia/Schnieder]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
16656 The separation from here to there is not the same as the separation from there to here
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes
16644 The features of a thing (whether quality or quantity) are inseparable from their subjects
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
5117 Heavy and light are defined by their tendency to move down or up
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
17041 Natural objects include animals and their parts, plants, and the simple elements
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
16172 Substance is not predicated of anything - but it still has something underlying it, that originates it
16623 We only infer underlying natures by analogy, observing bronze of a statue, or wood of a bed
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
16174 A nature is related to a substance as shapeless matter is to something which has a shape
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
17043 Form, not matter, is a thing's nature, because it is actual, rather than potential
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / c. Form as causal
16970 A thing's form and purpose are often the same, and form can be the initiator of change too
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / d. Form as unifier
16104 Unity of the form is just unity of the definition
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 3. Matter of an Object
11255 In feature-generation the matter (such as bronze) endures, but in generation it doesn't [Politis]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
16791 There is no whole except for the parts
9071 We first sense whole entities, and then move to particular parts of it
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
16972 The four explanations are the main aspects of a thing's nature [Moravcsik]
5084 A thing's nature is what causes its changes and stability
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 2. Objects that Change
16173 Coming to be is by shape-change, addition, subtraction, composition or alteration
17042 Natural things are their own source of stability through change
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 6. Successive Things
16691 A day, or the games, has one thing after another, actually and potentially occurring
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 10. Beginning of an Object
16574 Coming-to-be may be from nothing in a qualified way, as arising from an absence
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 4. Potentiality
11254 Matter is potentiality [Politis]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 7. Chance
13106 Maybe there is no pure chance; a man's choices cause his chance meetings
13110 Intrinsic cause is prior to coincidence, so nature and intelligence are primary causes, chance secondary
13108 Chance is a coincidental cause among events involving purpose and choice
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
8331 To know something we need understanding, which is grasp of the primary cause
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
5080 We know a thing if we grasp its first causes, principles and basic elements
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
16969 Science refers the question Why? to four causes/explanations: matter, form, source, purpose
11250 Four Explanations: the essence and form; the matter; the source; and the end [Politis]
12045 Aristotle's four 'causes' are four items which figure in basic explanations of nature [Annas]
16968 There are as many causes/explanations as there are different types of why-question
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
13109 Chance is inexplicable, because we can only explain what happens always or usually
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
9789 You can't abstract natural properties to make Forms - objects and attributes are defined together
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
9788 Mathematicians study what is conceptually separable, and doesn't lead to error
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
5107 Predicates are substance, quality, place, relation, quantity and action or affection
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
20042 We assign the cause of someone's walking when we say why they are doing it
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
5110 Goodness is when a thing (such as a circle) is complete, and conforms with its nature
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
5111 All moral virtue is concerned with bodily pleasure and pain
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
5113 Nothing natural is disorderly, because nature is responsible for all order
5085 'Nature' refers to two things - form and matter
5092 Nature is a principle of change, so we must understand change first
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / a. Final purpose
5089 Nature has purpose, and aims at what is better. Is it coincidence that crops grow when it rains?
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / b. Limited purposes
5091 Teeth and crops are predictable, so they cannot be mere chance, but must have a purpose
5086 The nature of a thing is its end and purpose
5087 A thing's purpose is ambiguous, and from one point of view we ourselves are ends
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 3. Natural Function
5108 Is ceasing-to-be unnatural if it happens by force, and natural otherwise?
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
5095 The heavens seem to be infinite, because we cannot imagine their end
5093 Continuity depends on infinity, because the continuous is infinitely divisible
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / a. Greek matter
16762 Matter desires form, as female desires male, and ugliness desires beauty
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / f. Ancient elements
17464 When Aristotle's elements compound they are stable, so why would they ever separate? [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
11252 The 'form' of a thing explains why the matter constitutes that particular thing [Politis]
11253 A 'material' cause/explanation is the form of whatever is the source [Politis]
13107 Causes produce a few things in their own right, and innumerable things coincidentally
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 3. Final causes
8332 The four causes are the material, the form, the source, and the end
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / d. Knowing essences
9787 Scientists must know the essential attributes of the things they study
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
20063 Motion fulfils potentiality
5114 If movement can arise within an animal, why can't it also arise in the universe?
5116 When there is unnatural movement (e.g. fire going downwards) the cause is obvious
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 4. Substantival Space
5099 The universe as a whole is not anywhere
5097 If everything has a place, this causes an infinite regress, because each place must have place
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 5. Relational Space
5098 Place is not shape, or matter, or extension between limits; it is the limits of a body
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / b. Relative time
20920 If there were many cosmoses, each would have its own time, giving many times
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / c. Idealist time
5106 Would there be time if there were no mind?
22967 It is unclear whether time depends on the existence of soul
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / d. Time as measure
8590 Time does not exist without change
5104 Time is an aspect of change
22885 For Aristotle time is not a process but a means for measuring processes [Bardon]
22959 Time is not change, but the number we associate with change
22964 Change only exists in time through its being temporally measure
22965 Time measures rest, as well as change
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / i. Denying time
22956 How can time exist, when it is composed of what has ceased to be and is yet to be?
5102 If all of time has either ceased to exist, or has not yet happened, maybe time does not exist
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / a. Experience of time
5103 Time is not change, but requires change in our minds to be noticed
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / e. Tensed (A) series
22961 The present moment is obviously a necessary feature of time
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / h. Change in time
22916 Unlike time, change goes at different rates, and is usually localised [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / b. Instants
16693 Time has parts, but the now is not one of them, and time is not composed of nows
22958 Nows can't be linked together, any more than points on a line
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / d. Measuring time
22963 We measure change by time, and time by change, as they are interdefined
22968 Circular motion is the most obvious measure of time, and especially the celestial sphere
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / e. Present moment
22957 We can't tell whether the changing present moment is one thing, or a succession of things
22966 The present moment is a link (of past to future), and also a limit (of past and of future)
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 2. Eternal Universe
5083 Do things come to be from what is, or from what is not? Both seem problematical.
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
5119 The source of all movement must be indivisible and have no magnitude