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| 548 | Knowledge chosen for its own sake, rather than for results, is wisdom |
| 11228 | Wisdom seeks explanations, causes, and reasons why things are as they are [Politis] |
| 545 | It is not much help if a doctor knows about universals but not the immediate particular |
| 549 | All philosophy begins from wonder, either at the physical world, or at ideas |
| 1576 | If each of us can give some logos about parts of nature, our combined efforts can be impressive |
| 609 | Philosophy is a kind of science that deals with principles |
| 572 | Philosophy has different powers from dialectic, and a different life from sophistry |
| 624 | Absolute thinking is the thinking of thinking |
| 22171 | If only natural substances exist, science is first philosophy - but not if there is an immovable substance |
| 11242 | Wisdom is knowledge of principles and causes |
| 12038 | Translate as 'humans all desire by nature to understand' (not as 'to know') [Annas] |
| 559 | Even people who go astray in their opinions have contributed something useful |
| 623 | It is readily agreed that thinking is the most godlike of things in our experience |
| 6561 | A thing cannot be both in and not-in the same thing (at a given time) |
| 11282 | Aristotle does not take the principle of non-contradiction for granted [Politis] |
| 11281 | We cannot say that one thing both is and is not a man |
| 1602 | For Aristotle predication is regulated by Non-Contradiction, because underlying stability is essential [Roochnik] |
| 1601 | The most certain basic principle is that contradictories can't be true at the same time |
| 608 | There is no middle ground in contradiction, but there is in contrariety |
| 627 | If everything is made of opposites, are the opposed things made of opposites? |
| 628 | Not everything is composed of opposites; what, for example, is the opposite of matter? |
| 10953 | The parts of a definition are isomorphic to the parts of the entity |
| 10957 | The material element may be essential to a definition |
| 10960 | If we define 'man' as 'two-footed animal', why does that make man a unity? |
| 16094 | You can't define particulars, because accounts have to be generalised |
| 596 | Only substance [ousias] admits of definition |
| 10944 | A definition must be of something primary |
| 12360 | Definitions need the complex features of form, and don't need to mention the category [Wedin] |
| 16107 | Sometimes parts must be mentioned in definitions of essence, and sometimes not |
| 12355 | 'Plane' is the genus of plane figures, and 'solid' of solids, with differentiae picking out types of corner |
| 12352 | Whiteness can only belong to man because an individual like Callias happens to be white |
| 11383 | A definition is of the universal and of the kind |
| 10961 | Definition by division is into genus and differentiae |
| 12356 | If the genus is just its constitutive forms (or matter), then the definition is the account of the differentiae |
| 17040 | If I define you, I have to use terms which are all true of other things too |
| 12353 | Species and genera are largely irrelevant in 'Metaphysics' [Wedin] |
| 12081 | Aristotle's definitions are not unique, but apply to a range of individuals [Witt] |
| 12080 | Essence is not all the necessary properties, since these extend beyond the definition [Witt] |
| 11153 | A definition is an account of a what-it-was-to-be-that-thing |
| 15770 | Some things cannot be defined, and only an analogy can be given |
| 574 | Not everything can be proven, because that would lead to an infinite regress |
| 10913 | Truth is a matter of asserting correct combinations and separations |
| 10914 | Simple and essential truth seems to be given, with further truth arising in thinking |
| 10916 | Truth is either intuiting a way of being, or a putting together |
| 575 | If one error is worse than another, it must be because it is further from the truth |
| 15775 | Truth-thinking does not make it so; it being so is what makes it true |
| 10915 | The truth or falsity of a belief will be in terms of something that is always this way not that |
| 586 | Falsity says that which is isn't, and that which isn't is; truth says that which is is, and that which isn't isn't |
| 19165 | Aristotle's truth formulation concerns referring parts of sentences, not sentences as wholes [Davidson] |
| 562 | Axioms are the underlying principles of everything, and who but the philosopher can assess their truth? |
| 573 | The axioms of mathematics are part of philosophy |
| 22154 | For Aristotle bivalence is a feature of reality [Boulter] |
| 11258 | We must start with our puzzles, and progress by solving them, as they reveal the real difficulty |
| 11262 | Aporia 1: is there one science of explanation, or many? [Politis] |
| 11263 | Aporia 2: Does one science investigate both ultimate and basic principles of being? [Politis] |
| 11268 | Aporia 7: Is a thing's kind the most general one, or the most specific one? [Politis] |
| 11269 | Aporia 8: Are there general kinds, or merely particulars? [Politis] |
| 11266 | Aporia 5: Do other things exist besides what is perceptible by the senses? [Politis] |
| 11267 | Aporia 6: Are the basic principles of a thing the kinds to which it belongs, or its components? [Politis] |
| 11264 | Aporia 3: Does one science investigate all being, or does each kind of being have a science? [Politis] |
| 11265 | Aporia 4: Does metaphysics just investigate pure being, or also the characteristics of being? [Politis] |
| 11270 | Aporia 9: Is there one principle, or one kind of principle? [Politis] |
| 11271 | Aporia 10: Do perishables and imperishables have the same principle? [Politis] |
| 11272 | Aporia 11: Are primary being and unity distinct, or only in the things that are? [Politis] |
| 11273 | Aporia 12: Do mathematical entities exist independently, or only in objects? [Politis] |
| 11274 | Aporia 13: Are there kinds, as well as particulars and mathematical entities? [Politis] |
| 11275 | Aporia 14: Are ultimate causes of things potentialities, or must they be actual? [Politis] |
| 11276 | Aporia 15: Are the causes of things universals or particulars? [Politis] |
| 560 | Mathematical precision is only possible in immaterial things |
| 9076 | Mathematics studies the domain of perceptible entities, but its subject-matter is not perceptible |
| 10958 | Perhaps numbers are substances? |
| 13273 | Pluralities divide into discontinous countables; magnitudes divide into continuous things |
| 12074 | The one in number just is the particular |
| 17845 | If only rectilinear figures existed, then unity would be the triangle |
| 17859 | Units came about when the unequals were equalised |
| 17844 | The unit is stipulated to be indivisible |
| 17861 | Two men do not make one thing, as well as themselves |
| 646 | When we count, are we adding, or naming numbers? |
| 17850 | Each many is just ones, and is measured by the one |
| 17851 | Number is plurality measured by unity |
| 17843 | The idea of 'one' is the foundation of number |
| 9793 | Mathematics studies abstracted relations, commensurability and proportion |
| 13738 | It is a simple truth that the objects of mathematics have being, of some sort |
| 12339 | Aristotle removes ontology from mathematics, and replaces the true with the beautiful [Badiou] |
| 568 | Some things exist as substances, others as properties of substances |
| 611 | Being, taken simply as being, is the domain of philosophy |
| 11288 | Things are predicated of the basic thing, which isn't predicated of anything else |
| 12348 | There are four kinds of being: incidental, per se, potential and actual, and being as truth [Wedin] |
| 11194 | Being is either what falls in the categories, or what makes propositions true [Aquinas] |
| 15776 | There is only being in a certain way, and without that way there is no being |
| 11234 | The three main candidates for primary being are particular, universal and essence; essence is the answer [Politis] |
| 11279 | Primary being is either universals, or the basis of predication, or essence [Politis] |
| 11232 | Primary being ('proté ousia') exists in virtue of itself, not in relation to other things [Politis] |
| 11293 | Non-primary beings lack essence, or only have a derived essence [Politis] |
| 11297 | Primary being is both the essence, and the subject of predication [Politis] |
| 566 | If nothing exists except individuals, how can there be a science of infinity? |
| 16090 | Being must be understood with reference to one primary sense - the being of substance [Gill,ML] |
| 570 | Nothing is added to a man's existence by saying he is 'one', or that 'he exists' |
| 12061 | The primary subject seems to be substance, to the fullest extent |
| 10946 | Existence requires thisness, as quantity or quality |
| 16152 | Other types of being all depend on the being of substance |
| 11295 | There is no being unless it is determinate and well-defined [Politis] |
| 13735 | Aristotle discusses fundamental units of being, rather than existence questions [Schaffer,J] |
| 16118 | Nature is an active principle of change, like potentiality, but it is intrinsic to things |
| 15768 | An actuality is usually thought to be a process |
| 11154 | Prior things can exist without posterior things, but not vice versa |
| 12095 | Knowledge of potential is universal and indefinite; of the actual it is definite and of individuals |
| 11256 | Materialists cannot explain change [Politis] |
| 12347 | The immediate divisions of that which is are genera, each with its science |
| 7935 | There cannot be uninstantiated properties [Macdonald,C] |
| 16161 | Properties are just the ways in which forms are realised at various times [Frede,M] |
| 15109 | The 'propriae' or 'necessary accidents' of a thing are separate, and derived from the essence [Koslicki] |
| 17849 | For two things to differ in some respect, they must both possess that respect |
| 7686 | For Aristotle, there are only as many properties as actually exist [Jacquette] |
| 10947 | Whiteness can be explained without man, but femaleness cannot be explained without animal |
| 10956 | If we only saw bronze circles, would bronze be part of the concept of a circle? |
| 16113 | Potentiality is a principle of change, in another thing, or as another thing |
| 16114 | Active 'dunamis' is best translated as 'power' or 'ability' (rather than 'potentiality') [Gill,ML] |
| 11387 | The main characteristic of the source of change is activity [energeia] [Politis] |
| 15773 | Actualities are arranged by priority, going back to what initiates process |
| 16753 | Giving the function of a house defines its actuality |
| 15780 | Potentiality in geometry is metaphorical |
| 11938 | The Megarans say something is only capable of something when it is actually doing it |
| 15766 | Megaran actualism is just scepticism about the qualities of things |
| 15767 | Megaran actualists prevent anything from happening, by denying a capacity for it to happen! |
| 11379 | Substance is not a universal, as the former is particular but a universal is shared |
| 12096 | Universals are indeterminate and only known in potential, because they are general [Witt] |
| 649 | The acquisition of scientific knowledge is impossible without universals |
| 12094 | No universals exist separately from particulars |
| 10948 | Forms are said to be substances to which nothing is prior |
| 16110 | If partaking explains unity, what causes participating, and what is participating? |
| 647 | There is a confusion because Forms are said to be universal, but also some Forms are separable and particular |
| 633 | If you accept Forms, you must accept the more powerful principle of 'participating' in them |
| 643 | How can the Forms both be the substance of things and exist separately from them? |
| 9483 | Forms have to be their own paradigms, which seems to fuse the paradigm and the copy |
| 605 | The Forms have to be potentialities, not actual knowledge or movement |
| 640 | All attempts to prove the Forms are either invalid, or prove Forms where there aren't supposed to be any |
| 16108 | If men exist by participating in two forms (Animal and Biped), they are plural, not unities |
| 645 | If two is part of three then numbers aren't Forms, because they would all be intermingled |
| 4470 | Aristotle is not asserting facts about the location of properties, but about their ontological status [Moreland] |
| 16145 | Predications only pick out kinds of things, not things in themselves |
| 618 | There is no point at all in the theory of Forms unless it contains a principle that produces movement |
| 641 | Are there forms for everything, or for negations, or for destroyed things? |
| 642 | What possible contribution can the Forms make to perceptible entities? |
| 16158 | Form and matter may not make up a concrete particular, because there are also accidents like weight [Frede,M] |
| 16086 | Objects lacking matter are intrinsic unities |
| 10945 | Some philosophers say that in some qualified way non-existent things 'are' |
| 11247 | To know a thing is to know its primary cause or explanation |
| 12062 | Aristotle's form improves on being non-predicable as a way to identify a 'this' [Wiggins] |
| 16160 | For Aristotle, things are not made individual by some essential distinguishing mark [Frede,M] |
| 16156 | Individuals within a species differ in their matter, form and motivating cause |
| 603 | How is man a unity of animal and biped, especially if the Forms of animal and of biped exist? |
| 16163 | Aristotle says that the form is what makes an entity what it is [Frede,M] |
| 10949 | Primary things just are what-it-is-to-be-that-thing |
| 17838 | Things may be naturally unified because they involve an indivisible process |
| 17841 | The formal cause may be what unifies a substance |
| 17840 | A unity may just be a particular, a numerically indivisible thing |
| 590 | Things are one numerically in matter, formally in their account, generically in predicates, and by analogy in relations |
| 13272 | Things are one to the extent that they are indivisible |
| 17842 | Indivisibility is the cause of unity, either in movement, or in the account or thought |
| 17860 | Things are unified by contact, mixture and position |
| 17839 | Some things are unified by their account, which rests on a unified thought about the thing |
| 592 | The baffling question of what exists is asking about the nature of substance |
| 12076 | Substance is prior in being separate, in definition, and in knowledge [Witt] |
| 11284 | It is wrong to translate 'ousia' as 'substance' [Politis] |
| 569 | If substance is the basis of reality, then philosophy aims to understand substance |
| 615 | The Pre-Socratics were studying the principles, elements and causes of substance |
| 11231 | 'Ousia' is 'primary being' not 'primary substance' [Politis] |
| 599 | We may have to postulate unobservable and unknowable substances |
| 600 | Elements and physical objects are substances, but ideas and mathematics are not so clear |
| 16778 | Mature Aristotle sees organisms as the paradigm substances [Pasnau] |
| 16084 | Is a primary substance a foundation of existence, or the last stage of understanding? [Gill,ML] |
| 11299 | Substance [ousia] is the subject of predication and cause [aitia?] of something's existence |
| 12060 | Essence (fixed by definition) is also 'ousia', so 'ousia' is both ultimate subject, and a this-thing |
| 595 | It is matter that turns out to be substance [ousia] |
| 10941 | A substance is what-it-is-to-be, or the universal, or the genus, or the subject of saying |
| 11290 | Matter is not substance, because substance needs separability and thisness |
| 10959 | The substance is the form dwelling in the object |
| 12093 | Substance is unified and universals are diverse, so universals are not substance [Witt] |
| 12362 | A thing's substance is its primary cause of being |
| 607 | None of the universals can be a substance |
| 11233 | In Aristotle, 'proté ousia' is 'primary being', and 'to hupokeimenon' is 'that which lies under' (or 'substance') [Politis] |
| 12079 | Substance is distinct being because of its unity [Witt] |
| 16096 | Statues depend on their bronze, but bronze doesn't depend on statues [Gill,ML] |
| 10951 | The statue is not called 'stone' but 'stoney' |
| 16085 | Primary matter and form make a unity, one in potentiality, the other in actuality |
| 12345 | In 'Metaphysics' Z substantial primacy (as form) is explanatory rather than ontological [Wedin] |
| 11285 | The form of a thing is its essence and its primary being |
| 16147 | In 'Metaphysics' substantial forms take over from objects as primary [Frede,M] |
| 11251 | Plato says changing things have no essence; Aristotle disagrees [Politis] |
| 12071 | Essences are not properties (since those can't cause individual substances) [Witt] |
| 12084 | Essential form is neither accidental nor necessary to matter, so it appears not to be a property [Witt] |
| 16119 | Aristotle's cosmos is ordered by form, and disordered by matter [Gill,ML] |
| 16148 | Aristotle moved from realism to nominalism about substances [Frede,M] |
| 16112 | A substance is a proper subject because the matter is a property of the form, not vice versa [Gill,ML] |
| 12002 | Aristotle doesn't think essential properties are those which must belong to a thing [Kung] |
| 16164 | Forms of sensible substances include unrealised possibilities, so are not fully actual [Frede,M] |
| 16095 | Some forms, such as the Prime Mover, are held by Aristotle to exist without matter [Gill,ML] |
| 15853 | A true substance is constituted by some nature, which is a principle |
| 16109 | Things are a unity because there is no clash between potential matter and actual shape/form |
| 16088 | Aristotle's solution to the problem of unity is that form is an active cause or potentiality or nature [Gill,ML] |
| 12301 | Every distinct thing has matter, as long as it isn't an essence or a Form |
| 16092 | In Aristotle, bronze only becomes 'matter' when it is potentially a statue [Gill,ML] |
| 12300 | Aristotle's conception of matter applies to non-physical objects as well as physical objects [Fine,K] |
| 12077 | Aristotle's matter is something that could be the inner origin of a natural being's behaviour [Witt] |
| 12103 | Matter is secondary, because it is potential, determined by the actuality of form [Witt] |
| 597 | Is there a house over and above its bricks? |
| 16575 | Something must pre-exist any new production |
| 10962 | It is unclear whether Aristotle believes in a propertyless subject, his 'ultimate matter' [Lawson-Tancred] |
| 16142 | A substrate is either a 'this' supporting qualities, or 'matter' supporting actuality |
| 16103 | A subject can't be nothing, so it must qualify as separate, and as having a distinct identity [Gill,ML] |
| 10942 | If you extract all features of the object, what is left over? |
| 13274 | The contents of an explanatory formula are parts of the whole |
| 15852 | A 'whole' (rather than a mere 'sum') requires an internal order which distinguishes it |
| 15840 | If a syllable is more than its elements, is the extra bit also an element? |
| 16136 | A syllable is something different from its component vowels and consonants |
| 12878 | Wholes are continuous, rigid, uniform, similar, same kind, similar matter [Simons] |
| 11199 | Aristotelian essence underlies behaviour, or underlies definition, or is the source of existence [Aquinas] |
| 12304 | Aristotelian essence is retained with identity through change, and bases our scientific knowledge [Copi] |
| 11294 | Aristotle says changing, material things (and not just universals) have an essence [Politis] |
| 11298 | Are essences actually universals? [Politis] |
| 12099 | Aristotelian essences are causal, not classificatory [Witt] |
| 17846 | The essence of a single thing is the essence of a particular |
| 12311 | Particulars are not definable, because they fluctuate |
| 12069 | Essence is the cause of individual substance, and creates its unity [Witt] |
| 12070 | Individual essences are not universals, since those can't be substances, or cause them [Witt] |
| 12088 | Aristotelian essence is not universal properties, but individual essence [Witt] |
| 11998 | Aristotle does not accept individual essences; essential properties are always general [Kung] |
| 12083 | Aristotle's essence explains the existence of an individual substance, not its properties [Witt] |
| 11382 | Aristotle takes essence and form as a particular, not (as some claim) as a universal, the species [Politis] |
| 16097 | To be a subject a thing must be specifiable, with some essential properties [Gill,ML] |
| 11287 | Essence is what is stated in the definition [Politis] |
| 10963 | A thing's essence is what is mentioned in its definition [Lawson-Tancred] |
| 12091 | If definition is of universals, many individuals have no definition, and hence no essence [Witt] |
| 11292 | Things have an essence if their explanation is a definition |
| 11188 | The Aristotelian view is that the essential properties are those that sort an object [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| 11291 | A thing's essence is its intrinsic nature |
| 12098 | An essence causes both its own unity and its kind |
| 10964 | Having an essence is the criterion of being a substance [Lawson-Tancred] |
| 15107 | Aristotle doesn't see essential truths or essential properties as necessary [Koslicki] |
| 11244 | Metaphysics is the science of ultimate explanation, or of pure existence, or of primary existence [Politis] |
| 16143 | It is absurd that a this and a substance should be composed of a quality |
| 16106 | Generalities like man and horse are not substances, but universal composites of account and matter |
| 16144 | Genera are not substances, and do not exist apart from the ingredient species |
| 12359 | 'Categories' answers 'what?' with species, genus, differerentia; 'Met.' Z.17 seeks causal essence [Wedin] |
| 12068 | Standardly, Aristotelian essences are taken to be universals of the species [Witt] |
| 16141 | In 'Met.' he says genera can't be substances or qualities, so aren't in the ontology [Frede,M] |
| 16508 | Things are more unified if the unity comes from their own nature, not from external force |
| 16117 | The hallmark of an artefact is that its active source of maintenance is external [Gill,ML] |
| 12092 | Aristotle claims that the individual is epistemologically prior to the universal [Witt] |
| 12090 | Actual knowledge is of the individual, and potential knowledge of the universal [Witt] |
| 16159 | For animate things, only the form, not the matter or properties, must persist through change [Frede,M] |
| 11378 | How a thing is generated does not explain its essence [Politis] |
| 12101 | Aristotle wants definition, not identity, so origin is not essential to him [Witt] |
| 11380 | Two things with the same primary being and essence are one thing |
| 17848 | Things such as two different quadrangles are alike but not wholly the same |
| 16134 | We can't understand self-identity without a prior grasp of the object |
| 17847 | You are one with yourself in form and matter |
| 12611 | Necessity makes alternatives impossible |
| 17852 | A thing has a feature necessarily if its denial brings a contradiction |
| 15769 | Anything which is possible either exists or will come into existence |
| 15779 | Possibility is when the necessity of the contrary is false |
| 15777 | A 'potentiality' is a principle of change or process in a thing |
| 15774 | We recognise potentiality from actuality |
| 14544 | Potentialities are always for action, but are conditional on circumstances |
| 15778 | Things are destroyed not by their powers, but by their lack of them |
| 12612 | Some things have external causes of their necessity; others (the simple) generate necessities |
| 15108 | Aristotle's says necessary truths are distinct and derive from essential truths [Koslicki] |
| 547 | The ability to teach is a mark of true knowledge |
| 10950 | Things are produced from skill if the form of them is in the mind |
| 544 | Experience knows particulars, but only skill knows universals |
| 546 | It takes skill to know causes, not experience |
| 543 | All men long to understand, as shown by their delight in the senses |
| 583 | The starting point of a proof is not a proof |
| 581 | Dreams aren't a serious problem. No one starts walking round Athens next morning, having dreamt that they were there! |
| 585 | If relativism is individual, how can something look sweet and not taste it, or look different to our two eyes? |
| 584 | If truth is relative it is relational, and concerns appearances relative to a situation |
| 576 | If the majority had diseased taste, and only a few were healthy, relativists would have to prefer the former |
| 12309 | There cannot be a science of accidentals, but only of general truths |
| 11386 | Demonstrations about particulars must be about everything of that type |
| 11385 | Universal principles are not primary beings, but particular principles are not universally knowable |
| 11289 | Understanding moves from the less to the more intelligible |
| 11246 | Aristotelian explanations mainly divide things into natural kinds [Politis] |
| 16135 | Real enquiries seek causes, and causes are essences |
| 11384 | We know something when we fully know what it is, not just its quality, quantity or location |
| 16105 | We know a thing when we grasp its essence |
| 11296 | The explanation is what gives matter its state, which is the form, which is the substance |
| 11999 | Essential properties explain in conjunction with properties shared by the same kind [Kung] |
| 9088 | Skill comes from a general assumption obtained from thinking about similar things |
| 16153 | Aristotle distinguishes two different sorts of generality - kinds, and properties [Frede,M] |
| 9791 | Science is more accurate when it is prior and simpler, especially without magnitude or movement |
| 571 | Is Socrates the same person when standing and when seated? |
| 23311 | Aristotle sees reason as much more specific than our more everyday concept of it [Frede,M] |
| 23310 | Animals live by sensations, and some have good memories, but they don't connect experiences |
| 11245 | Many memories make up a single experience |
| 10954 | It is unclear whether acute angles are prior to right angles, or fingers to men |
| 9792 | Mathematicians study quantity and continuity, and remove the perceptible features of things |
| 9077 | Mathematicians suppose inseparable aspects to be separable, and study them in isolation |
| 9075 | If health happened to be white, the science of health would not study whiteness |
| 636 | Beauty involves the Forms of order, symmetry and limit, which can be handled mathematically |
| 635 | The good is found in actions, but beauty can exist without movement |
| 15772 | A thing's active function is its end |
| 629 | Is the good a purpose, a source of movement, or a pure form? |
| 591 | Excellence is a sort of completion |
| 625 | Is excellence separate from things, or part of them, or both? |
| 621 | Contemplation is a supreme pleasure and excellence |
| 11241 | Wise men aren't instructed; they instruct |
| 632 | Why are some things destructible and others not? |
| 626 | Everything is arranged around a single purpose |
| 17858 | Pythagoreans say the whole universe is made of numbers |
| 10955 | Matter is perceptible (like bronze) or intelligible (like mathematical objects) |
| 601 | Substance must exist, because something must endure during change between opposites |
| 12299 | Aristotle had a hierarchical conception of matter [Fine,K] |
| 16590 | Matter is neither a particular thing nor a member of a determinate category |
| 12001 | Aristotle says matter is a lesser substance, rather than wholly denying that it is a substance [Kung] |
| 15771 | Primary matter is what characterises other stuffs, and it has no distinct identity |
| 12868 | Ultimate matter is discredited, as Aristotle merged substratum of change with bearer of properties [Simons] |
| 16099 | The traditional view of Aristotle is God (actual form) at top and prime matter (potential matter) at bottom [Gill,ML] |
| 15954 | Aristotle may only have believed in prime matter because his elements were immutable [Alexander,P] |
| 616 | It doesn't explain the world to say it was originally all one. How did it acquire diversity? |
| 16098 | I claim that Aristotle's foundation is the four elements, and not wholly potential prime matter [Gill,ML] |
| 10952 | Unusual kinds like mule are just a combination of two kinds |
| 561 | Is there cause outside matter, and can it be separated, and is it one or many? |
| 588 | We exercise to be fit, but need fitness to exercise |
| 634 | Pure Forms and numbers can't cause anything, and especially not movement |
| 14543 | When a power and its object meet in the right conditions, an action necessarily follows |
| 617 | It is hard to see how either time or movement could come into existence or be destroyed |
| 613 | Even if the world is caused by fate, mind and nature are still prior causes |
| 619 | Something which both moves and is moved is intermediate, so it follows that there must be an unmoved mover |
| 620 | The first mover is necessary, and because it is necessary it is good |
| 622 | There must a source of movement which is eternal, indivisible and without magnitude |
| 7603 | God is not a creator (involving time and change) and is not concerned with the inferior universe [Armstrong,K] |
| 16165 | For Aristotle God is defined in an axiom, for which there is no proof [Frede,M] |
| 610 | The world can't be arranged at all if there is nothing eternal and separate |
| 12097 | There are as many eternal unmovable substances as there are movements of the stars |