Ideas from 'Critique of Pure Reason' by Immanuel Kant [1781], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Critique of Pure Reason' by Kant,Immanuel (ed/tr Guyer,P /Wood,A W) [CUO 1998,0-521-65729-6]].
green numbers give full details |
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expand these ideas
1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
5540
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Cleverness is shown in knowing what can reasonably be asked
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1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
5631
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Reason is only interested in knowledge, actions and hopes
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1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
5635
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In ordinary life the highest philosophy is no better than common understanding
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1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
21954
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Metaphysics is a systematic account of everything that can be known a priori
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1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
7918
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Kant turned metaphysics into epistemology, ignoring Aristotle's 'being qua being' [Macdonald,C]
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21438
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Metaphysics might do better to match objects to our cognition (and not start with the objects)
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16611
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You just can't stop metaphysical speculation, in any mature mind
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5586
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The voyage of reason may go only as far as the coastline of experience reaches
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1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
21462
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It is still possible to largely accept Kant as a whole (where others must be dismantled) [Gardner]
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5600
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Human reason considers all knowledge as belonging to a possible system
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21457
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Reason has two separate objects, morality and freedom, and nature, which ultimately unite
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1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
9349
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A dove cutting through the air, might think it could fly better in airless space (which Plato attempted)
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9752
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Kant showed that theoretical reason cannot give answers to speculative metaphysics [Korsgaard]
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6584
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A priori metaphysics is fond of basic unchanging entities like God, the soul, Forms, atoms… [Fogelin]
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1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics
12767
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Kant exposed the illusions of reason in the Transcendental Dialectic [Fraassen]
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1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
9350
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Our reason mostly analyses concepts we already have of objects
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5530
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Analysis of our concepts is merely a preparation for proper a priori metaphysics
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18259
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Analysis is becoming self-conscious about our concepts
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2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
5604
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In reason things can only begin if they are voluntary
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5622
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The boundaries of reason can only be determined a priori
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5623
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If I know the earth is a sphere, and I am on it, I can work out its area from a small part
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2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 3. Pure Reason
5578
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Pure reason deals with concepts in the understanding, not with objects
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5628
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Reason hates to be limited in its speculations
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5603
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Pure reason exists outside of time
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5616
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Pure reason is only concerned with itself because it deals with understandings, not objects
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2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
21439
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Religion and legislation can only be respected if they accept free and public examination
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5584
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All objections are dogmatic (against propositions), or critical (against proofs), or sceptical
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18236
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Reason keeps asking why until explanation is complete [Korsgaard]
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2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
5563
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The principle of sufficient reason is the ground of possible experience in time
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5565
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Proof of the principle of sufficient reason cannot be found
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2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
5602
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The free dialectic opposition of arguments is an invaluable part of the sceptical method
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2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
5618
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Definitions exhibit the exhaustive concept of a thing within its boundaries
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2. Reason / D. Definition / 13. Against Definition
5619
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No a priori concept can be defined
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2. Reason / E. Argument / 2. Transcendental Argument
22274
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'Transcendent' is beyond experience, and 'transcendental' is concealed within experience [Potter]
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5577
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Transcendental ideas require unity of the subject, conditions of appearance, and objects of thought
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23696
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Transcendental cognition is that a priori thought which shows how the a priori is applicable or possible
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2. Reason / E. Argument / 3. Analogy
5555
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Philosophical examples rarely fit rules properly, and lead to inflexibility
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3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
5539
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We must presuppose that truth is agreement of cognition with its objects
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4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / e. Axioms of PL
5620
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Philosophy has no axioms, as it is just rational cognition of concepts
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5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
18794
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Logic has precise boundaries, and is the formal rules for all thinking
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5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 2. Formal Truth
5542
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There must be a general content-free account of truth in the rules of logic
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5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 3. Antinomies
21454
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The battle of the antinomies is usually won by the attacker, and lost by any defender
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6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
8739
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Geometry studies the Euclidean space that dictates how we perceive things [Shapiro]
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8740
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Geometry would just be an idle game without its connection to our intuition
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16899
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Geometrical truth comes from a general schema abstracted from a particular object [Burge]
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6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / c. Potential infinite
9632
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Kant only accepts potential infinity, not actual infinity [Brown,JR]
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6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 3. Axioms for Geometry
3343
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Euclid's could be the only viable geometry, if rejection of the parallel line postulate doesn't lead to a contradiction [Benardete,JA]
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6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
8737
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Kant suggested that arithmetic has no axioms [Shapiro]
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5557
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Axioms ought to be synthetic a priori propositions
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6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 2. Intuition of Mathematics
12421
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Kant's intuitions struggle to judge relevance, impossibility and exactness [Kitcher]
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6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
17617
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Maths is a priori, but without its relation to empirical objects it is meaningless
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6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
2795
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If 7+5=12 is analytic, then an infinity of other ways to reach 12 have to be analytic [Dancy,J]
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12458
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Kant taught that mathematics is independent of logic, and cannot be grounded in it [Hilbert]
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7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
4475
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Saying a thing 'is' adds nothing to it - otherwise if my concept exists, it isn't the same as my concept
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
7416
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Kant is read as the phenomena being 'contrained' by the noumenon, or 'free-floating' [Talbot]
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24335
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Kant can't distinguish appearance from thing-in-itself, because he rejected the inference needed [Nietzsche]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
19386
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Without the subject or the senses, space and time vanish, as their appearances disappear
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21445
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Even the most perfect intuition gets no closer to things in themselves
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7. Existence / E. Categories / 1. Categories
21448
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Categories are general concepts of objects, which determine the way in which they are experienced
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5554
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Categories are necessary, so can't be implanted in us to agree with natural laws
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7. Existence / E. Categories / 2. Categorisation
6160
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Does Kant say the mind imposes categories, or that it restricts us to them? [Rowlands]
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8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 7. Against Powers
17772
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Kant claims causal powers are relational rather than intrinsic [Bayne]
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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
5533
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Objects in themselves are not known to us at all
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21449
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The a priori concept of objects in general is the ground of experience
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
5550
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A substance could exist as a subject, but not as a mere predicate
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
21451
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All appearances need substance, as that which persists through change
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5564
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Substance must exist, as the persisting substratum of the process of change
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9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
5626
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An a priori principle of persistence anticipates all experience
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
7576
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The Identity of Indiscernibles is true of concepts with identical properties, but not of particulars [Jolley]
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14509
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If we ignore differences between water drops, we still distinguish them by their location
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10. Modality / A. Necessity / 1. Types of Modality
18797
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Modalities do not augment our concepts; they express their relation to cognition
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10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
5594
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Natural necessity is the unconditioned necessity of appearances
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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
18795
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A concept is logically possible if non-contradictory (but may not be actually possible)
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5566
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Is the possible greater than the actual, and the actual greater than the necessary?
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5613
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The analytic mark of possibility is that it does not generate a contradiction
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10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
18796
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Formal experience conditions show what is possible, and general conditions what is necessary
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10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
23461
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Kant thought worldly necessities are revealed by what maths needs to make sense [Morris,M]
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14710
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Necessity is always knowable a priori, and what is known a priori is always necessary [Schroeter]
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16256
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For Kant metaphysics must be necessary, so a priori, so can't be justified by experience [Maudlin]
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5524
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Maths must be a priori because it is necessary, and that cannot be derived from experience
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11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
20944
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Knowledge is threefold: apprehension, reproduction by imagination, recognition by concepts [Bowie]
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5617
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Knowledge begins with intuitions, moves to concepts, and ends with ideas
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11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
15627
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Kant showed that the understanding (unlike reason) concerns what is finite and conditioned [Hegel]
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5573
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Reason is distinct from understanding, and is the faculty of rules or principles
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16898
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Understanding essentially involves singular elements [Burge]
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11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
5634
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Opinion is subjectively and objectively insufficient; belief is subjective but not objective; knowledge is both
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11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 5. Cogito Critique
5590
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'I think therefore I am' is an identity, not an inference (as there is no major premise)
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11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
5601
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There are possible inhabitants of the moon, but they are just possible experiences
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11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / a. Idealism
22003
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We have no sensual experience of time and space, so they must be 'ideal' [Pinkard]
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21456
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Objects having to be experiencable is not the same as full idealism [Gardner]
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21446
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If we disappeared, then all relations of objects, and time and space themselves, disappear too
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11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
6910
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Kant's idealism is a limited idealism based on the viewpoint of empiricism [Feuerbach]
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6909
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In Kantian idealism, objects fit understanding, not vice versa [Feuerbach]
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21440
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For Kant experience is either structured like reality, or generates reality's structure [Gardner]
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22006
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The concepts that make judgeable experiences possible are created spontaneously [Pinkard]
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21442
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'Transcendental' cognition concerns what can be known a priori of its mode
|
5568
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We cannot know things in themselves, but are confined to appearances
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5581
|
We have proved that bodies are appearances of the outer senses, not things in themselves
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21956
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Everything we intuit is merely a representation, with no external existence (Transcendental Idealism)
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12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
9156
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Kant's shift of view enables us to see a priority in terms of mental capacity, not truth and propositions [Burge]
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7575
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A priori knowledge is limited to objects of possible experience [Jolley]
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12414
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A priori knowledge occurs absolutely independently of all experience
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9351
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One sort of a priori knowledge just analyses given concepts, but another ventures further
|
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
9348
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Experienceless bodies have space; propertyless bodies have substance; this must be seen a priori
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12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
16893
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The apriori is independent of its sources, and marked by necessity and generality [Burge]
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5404
|
Two plus two objects make four objects even if experience is impossible, so Kant is wrong [Russell]
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9345
|
Propositions involving necessity are a priori, and pure a priori if they only derive from other necessities
|
9347
|
A priori knowledge is indispensable for the possibility and certainty of experience
|
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
3342
|
Seeing that only one parallel can be drawn to a line through a given point is clearly synthetic a priori [Benardete,JA]
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20943
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Kant bases the synthetic a priori on the categories of oneness and manyness [Bowie]
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5402
|
Kant showed that we have a priori knowledge which is not purely analytic [Russell]
|
5203
|
We can think of 7 and 5 without 12, but it is still a contradiction to deny 7+5=12 [Ayer]
|
5527
|
That a straight line is the shortest is synthetic, as straight does not imply any quantity
|
5528
|
That force and counter-force are equal is necessary, and a priori synthetic
|
5529
|
The real problem of pure reason is: how are a priori synthetic judgments possible?
|
5537
|
That two lines cannot enclose a space is an intuitive a priori synthetic proposition
|
5546
|
Are a priori concepts necessary as a precondition for something to be an object?
|
5558
|
7+5=12 is not analytic, because 12 is not contained in 7 or 5 or their combination
|
5624
|
We possess synthetic a priori knowledge in our principles which anticipate experience
|
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 6. A Priori from Reason
5571
|
Reason contains within itself certain underived concepts and principles
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12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 7. A Priori from Convention
5403
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If, as Kant says, arithmetic and logic are contributed by us, they could change if we did [Russell]
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12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
5525
|
No analysis of the sum of seven and five will in itself reveal twelve
|
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
18262
|
For Kant analytic knowledge needs complex concepts, but the a priori can rest on the simple [Coffa]
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5526
|
With large numbers it is obvious that we could never find the sum by analysing the concepts
|
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 10. A Priori as Subjective
5567
|
A priori the understanding can only anticipate possible experiences
|
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / b. Primary/secondary
18264
|
We know the shape of a cone from its concept, but we don't know its colour
|
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
5532
|
Colours and tastes are not qualities of things, but alterations of the subject
|
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
2774
|
Kant says the cognitive and sensory elements in experience can't be separated [Dancy,J]
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12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
23454
|
Appearances have a 'form', which indicates a relational order
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12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
5569
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We cannot represent objects unless we combine concepts with intuitions
|
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism
22005
|
Associations and causes cannot explain content, which needs norms of judgement [Pinkard]
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23697
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I exist just as an intelligence aware of its faculty for combination
|
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 4. Pro-Empiricism
6577
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For Kant, our conceptual scheme is disastrous when it reaches beyond experience [Fogelin]
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12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
5559
|
Sensations are a posteriori, but that they come in degrees is known a priori
|
5538
|
Understanding has no intuitions, and senses no thought, so knowledge needs their unity
|
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
8736
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Kantian intuitions are of particulars, and they give immediate knowledge [Shapiro]
|
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
5541
|
A sufficient but general sign of truth cannot possibly be provided
|
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
7070
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Kant says knowledge is when our representations sufficiently conform to our concepts [Critchley]
|
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
4708
|
Kant thought he had refuted scepticism, but his critics say he is a sceptic, for rejecting reality [O'Grady]
|
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
5595
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Scepticism is absurd in maths, where there are no hidden false assertions
|
5592
|
Scepticism is the euthanasia of pure reason
|
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
6578
|
For Kant, experience is relative to a scheme, but there are no further possible schemes [Fogelin]
|
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
5629
|
If a proposition implies any false consequences, then it is false
|
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 3. Mental Causation
5606
|
Freedom and natural necessity do not contradict, as they relate to different conditions
|
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
4086
|
Kant thought that consciousness depends on self-consciousness ('apperception') [Crane]
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15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 1. Faculties
2869
|
Kant's only answer as to how synthetic a priori judgements are possible was that we have a 'faculty'! [Nietzsche]
|
9346
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Judgements which are essentially and strictly universal reveal our faculty of a priori cognition
|
5572
|
Reason has logical and transcendental faculties
|
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 2. Imagination
22443
|
We are seldom aware of imagination, but we would have no cognition at all without it
|
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 3. Self as Non-physical
5627
|
I can express the motion of my body in a single point, but that doesn't mean it is a simple substance
|
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
9751
|
To some extent we must view ourselves as noumena [Korsgaard]
|
21450
|
Representation would be impossible without the 'I think' that accompanies it
|
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / a. Self needs body
5583
|
We need an account of the self based on rational principles, to avoid materialism
|
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
5570
|
Self-knowledge can only be inner sensation, and thus appearance
|
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
5551
|
I have no cognition of myself as I am, but only as I appear to myself
|
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / c. Inadequacy of mental continuity
21452
|
I can only determine my existence in time via external things
|
5582
|
As balls communicate motion, so substances could communicate consciousness, but not retain identity
|
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 3. Reference of 'I'
2965
|
For Kant the self is a purely formal idea, not a substance [Lockwood]
|
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 7. Self and Thinking
5549
|
Mental representations would not be mine if they did not belong to a unified self-consciousness
|
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
5596
|
We must assume an absolute causal spontaneity beginning from itself
|
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
9756
|
We must be free, because we can act against our strongest desires [Korsgaard]
|
5597
|
If there is a first beginning, there can be other sequences initiated from nothing
|
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
5585
|
Soul and body connect physically, or by harmony, or by assistance
|
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
5630
|
Our concept of an incorporeal nature is merely negative
|
5589
|
Neither materialism nor spiritualism can reveal the separate existence of the soul
|
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
5556
|
A pure concept of the understanding can never become an image
|
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
8687
|
Kantian 'intuition' is the bridge between pure reason and its application to sense experiences [Friend]
|
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 2. Categories of Understanding
21759
|
Kant deduced the categories from our judgements, and then as preconditions of experience [Houlgate]
|
19655
|
Kant says we can describe the categories of thought, but Hegel claims to deduce them [Meillassoux]
|
5552
|
Categories are concepts that prescribe laws a priori to appearances
|
5544
|
Four groups of categories of concept: Quantity, Quality, Relation and Modality
|
5547
|
The categories are objectively valid, because they make experience possible
|
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
17616
|
Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind
|
5553
|
Either experience creates concepts, or concepts make experience possible
|
5593
|
Reason generates no concepts, but frees them from their link to experience in the understanding
|
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / c. Concepts in psychology
22004
|
Concepts are rules for combining representations [Pinkard]
|
5543
|
All human cognition is through concepts
|
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / b. Analysis of concepts
8735
|
Kant implies that concepts have analysable parts [Shapiro]
|
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 1. Analytic Propositions
8734
|
Non-subject/predicate tautologies won't fit Kant's definition of analyticity [Shapiro]
|
7314
|
How can bachelor 'contain' unmarried man? Are all analytic truths in subject-predicate form? [Miller,A]
|
20291
|
If the predicate is contained in the subject of a judgement, it is analytic; otherwise synthetic
|
20292
|
Analytic judgements clarify, by analysing the subject into its component predicates
|
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / a. Preconditions for ethics
5599
|
Without God, creation and free will, morality would be empty
|
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
5576
|
We cannot derive moral laws from experience, as it is the mother of illusion
|
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / a. Normativity
21455
|
We only understand what exists, and can find no sign of what ought to be in nature
|
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 6. Motivation for Duty
5605
|
Moral blame is based on reason, since a reason is a cause which should have been followed
|
5632
|
Moral laws are commands, which must involve promises and threats, which only God could provide
|
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 5. Existence-Essence
6916
|
For Kant, essence is mental and a mere idea, and existence is the senses and mere appearance [Feuerbach]
|
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / d. Liberal freedom
5575
|
An obvious idea is a constitution based on maximum mutual freedom for citizens
|
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 6. Political freedom
5621
|
The existence of reason depends on the freedom of citizens to agree, doubt and veto ideas
|
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
22052
|
Kant's nature is just a system of necessary laws [Bowie]
|
8256
|
Kant identifies nature with the scientific picture of it as the realm of law [McDowell]
|
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / b. Limited purposes
5591
|
Reason must assume as necessary that everything in a living organism has a proportionate purpose
|
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / c. Matter as extension
5615
|
Extension and impenetrability together make the concept of matter
|
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
14560
|
A ball denting a pillow seems like simultaneous cause and effect, though time identifies which is cause
|
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
5545
|
Appearances give rules of what usually happens, but cause involves necessity
|
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
9755
|
The concept of causality entails laws; random causality is a contradiction [Korsgaard]
|
17709
|
We judge causation by relating events together by some law of nature [Mares]
|
5562
|
Experience is only possible because we subject appearances to causal laws
|
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
5523
|
Causation obviously involves necessity, so it cannot just be frequent association
|
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
19669
|
For Kant the laws must be necessary, because contingency would destroy representation [Meillassoux]
|
19672
|
Kant fails to prove the necessity of laws, because his reasoning about chance is over-ambitious [Meillassoux]
|
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 2. Space
17736
|
We can't learn of space through experience; experience of space needs its representation
|
5531
|
Space is an a priori necessary basic intuition, as we cannot imagine its absence
|
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / a. Absolute time
5536
|
If space and time exist absolutely, we must assume the existence of two pointless non-entities
|
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / c. Idealist time
5534
|
One can never imagine appearances without time, so it is given a priori
|
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / a. Experience of time
5560
|
The three modes of time are persistence, succession and simultaneity
|
5535
|
That times cannot be simultaneous is synthetic, so it is known by intuition, not analysis
|
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / b. Rate of time
5561
|
If time involved succession, we must think of another time in which succession occurs
|
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / b. Euthyphro question
5633
|
We don't accept duties as coming from God, but assume they are divine because they are duties
|
28. God / B. Proving God / 1. Proof of God
5607
|
Only three proofs of God: the physico-theological (evidence), the cosmological (existence), the ontological (a priori)
|
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
8451
|
Existence is merely derived from the word 'is' (rather than being a predicate) [Orenstein]
|
3321
|
Modern logic says (with Kant) that existence is not a predicate, because it has been reclassified as a quantifier [Benardete,JA]
|
13732
|
Kant never denied that 'exist' could be a predicate - only that it didn't enlarge concepts [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
|
5609
|
If 'this exists' is analytic, either the thing is a thought, or you have presupposed its existence
|
5608
|
Is "This thing exists" analytic or synthetic?
|
5610
|
If an existential proposition is synthetic, you must be able to cancel its predicate without contradiction
|
5611
|
Being is not a real predicate, that adds something to a concept
|
5612
|
You add nothing to the concept of God or coins if you say they exist
|
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / a. Cosmological Proof
5598
|
If you prove God cosmologically, by a regress in the sequences of causes, you can't abandon causes at the end
|