Ideas from 'Meditations' by René Descartes [1641], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Discourse on Method/The Meditations' by Descartes,René (ed/tr Sutcliffe,F.E.) [Penguin 1968,0-14-044206-5]].

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1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 5. Later European Thought

7504	Modern science comes from Descartes' view that knowledge doesn't need moral purity [Foucault]

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 2. Logos

1569	Descartes impoverished the classical idea of logos, and it no longer covered human experience [Roochnik]

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason

2248	Reason says don't assent to uncertain principles, just as much as totally false ones

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason

2857	Since Plato all philosophers have followed the herd, except Descartes, stuck in superficial reason [Nietzsche]

2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 4. Circularity

2290	Once it is clear that there is a God who is no deceiver, I conclude that clear and distinct perceptions must be true

3641	It is circular to make truth depend on believing God's existence is true [Arnauld]

4524	Descartes is right that in the Christian view only God can guarantee the reliability of senses [Nietzsche]

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 8. Subjective Truth

2266	My general rule is that everything that I perceive clearly and distinctly is true

4301	Someone may think a thing is 'clear and distinct', but be wrong [Leibniz]

5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism

10054

Arithmetic and geometry achieve some certainty without worrying about existence

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics

2252	Surely maths is true even if I am dreaming?

2430	I can learn the concepts of duration and number just from observing my own thoughts

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual

2297	If I can separate two things in my understanding, then God can separate them in reality

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique

3628	Substance cannot be conceived or explained to others [Gassendi]

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum

16631

If we remove surface qualities from wax, we have an extended, flexible, changeable thing

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition

17865

Descartes gives an essence by an encapsulating formula [Almog]

10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary

2301	We know by thought that what is done cannot be undone

10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible

3642	Pythagoras' Theorem doesn't cease to be part of the essence of triangles just because we doubt it [Arnauld]

11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs

20190

Belief is not an intellectual state or act, because propositions are affirmed or denied by the will [Zagzebski]

11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty

2256	Maybe there is only one certain fact, which is that nothing is certain

1585	Descartes tried to model reason on maths instead of 'logos' [Roochnik]

1582	Labelling slightly doubtful things as false is irrational [Roochnik]

11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito

2258	I must even exist if I am being deceived by something

3160	The Cogito is a transcendental argument, not a piece of a priori knowledge [Rey]

2260	If I don't think, there is no reason to think that I exist

3849	"I think therefore I am" is the absolute truth of consciousness [Sartre]

6929	Modern philosophy set the self-conscious ego in place of God [Feuerbach]

6914	Descartes transformed 'God is thinkable, so he exists' into 'I think, so I exist' [Feuerbach]

4641	In the Meditations version of the Cogito he says "I am; I exist", which avoids presenting it as an argument [Baggini /Fosl]

2259	"I am, I exist" is necessarily true every time I utter it or conceive it in my mind

11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 5. Cogito Critique

2873	Maybe 'I' am not the thinker, but something produced by thought [Nietzsche]

1369	It is a precondition of the use of the word 'I' that I exist [Ayer]

5360	The thing which experiences may be momentary, and change with the next experience [Russell]

2870	'I think' assumes I exist, that thinking is known and caused, and that I am doing it [Nietzsche]

5188	A thought doesn't imply other thoughts, or enough thoughts to make up a self [Ayer]

3624	That I perform an activity (thinking) doesn't prove what type of thing I am [Hobbes]

4526	The Cogito assumes a priori the existence of substance, when actually it is a grammatical custom [Nietzsche]

5579	How can we infer that all thinking involves self-consciousness, just from my own case? [Kant]

5580	My self is not an inference from 'I think', but a presupposition of it [Kant]

5587	We cannot give any information a priori about the nature of the 'thing that thinks' [Kant]

5588	The fact that I am a subject is not enough evidence to show that I am a substantial object [Kant]

13923

Descartes' claim to know his existence before his essence is misleading or absurd [Lowe]

6930	Modern self-consciousness is a doubtful abstraction; only senses and feelings are certain [Feuerbach]

1117	The Cogito proves subjective experience is basic, but makes false claims about the Self [Russell]

3120	Autistic children seem to use the 'I' concept without seeing themselves as thinkers [Segal]

3623	The Cogito only works if you already understand what thought and existence are [Mersenne]

11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism

2261	My perceiving of things may be false, but my seeming to perceive them cannot be false

11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 4. Solipsism

2257	I myself could be the author of all these self-delusions

12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities

2279	A triangle has a separate non-invented nature, shown by my ability to prove facts about it

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities

6490	For Descartes, objects have one primary quality, which is geometrical [Robinson,H]

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation

2295	Why does pain make us sad?

12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism

2263	The wax is not perceived by the senses, but by the mind alone

3627	Dogs can make the same judgements as us about variable things [Gassendi]

2265	We perceive objects by intellect, not by senses or imagination

2264	We don't 'see' men in heavy clothes, we judge them to be men

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism

2247	To achieve good science we must rebuild from the foundations

2255	Only one certainty is needed for progress (like a lever's fulcrum)

13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism

2251	Even if my body and objects are imaginary, there may be simpler things which are true

6347	Descartes can't begin again, because sceptics doubt cognitive processes as well as beliefs [Pollock/Cruz]

13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 3. Illusion Scepticism

3620	We correct sense errors with other senses, not intellect [Mersenne]

2249	It is prudent never to trust your senses if they have deceived you even once

3619	The senses can only report, so perception errors are in the judgment [Gassendi]

2296	If pain is felt in a lost limb, I cannot be certain that a felt pain exists in my real limbs

13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 4. Demon Scepticism

2253	God may have created nothing, but made his creation appear to me as it does now

2254	To achieve full scepticism, I imagine a devil who deceives me about the external world and my own body and senses

13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 5. Dream Scepticism

2305	Waking actions are joined by memory to all our other actions, unlike actions of which we dream

13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique

2294	I can only sense an object if it is present, and can't fail to sense it when it is

15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 3. Mental Causation

4862	Can the pineal gland be moved more slowly or quickly by the mind than by animal spirits? [Spinoza]

15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds

3850	We discovers others as well as ourselves in the Cogito [Sartre]

15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind

2302	Faculties of the mind aren't parts, as one mind uses them

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia

3151	Descartes put thought at the centre of the mind problem, but we put sensation [Rey]

15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 1. Faculties

21800

Descartes mentions many cognitive faculties, but reduces them to will and intellect [Schmid]

15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 2. Imagination

1399	Imagination and sensation are non-essential to mind

16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 1. Existence of Persons

1400	Some cause must unite the separate temporal sections of a person

16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 7. Self and Thinking

1401	Since I only observe myself to be thinking, I conclude that that is my essence

2299	I can exist without imagination and sensing, but they can't exist without me

6907	For Descartes a person's essence is the mind because objects are perceived by mind, not senses [Feuerbach]

16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will

2283	Our 'will' just consists of the feeling that when we are motivated to do something, there are no external pressures

16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will

2282	My capacity to make choices with my free will extends as far as any faculty ever could

17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism

2276	The mind is a non-extended thing which thinks

2298	Mind is not extended, unlike the body

3423	Descartes is a substance AND property dualist [Kim]

2303	The mind is utterly indivisible

17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism

6153	Interaction between mental and physical seems to violate the principle of conservation of energy [Rowlands]

17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique

3625	The 'thinking thing' may be the physical basis of the mind [Hobbes]

2552	Knowing different aspects of brain/mind doesn't make them different [Rorty]

4305	Descartes gives no clear criterion for individuating mental substances [Cottingham]

4861	Does Descartes have a clear conception of how mind unites with body? [Spinoza]

6540	Even Descartes may concede that mental supervenes on neuroanatomical [Lycan]

7733	Superman's strength is indubitable, Clark Kent's is doubtful, so they are not the same? [Maslin]

18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 2. Propositional Attitudes

5686	In some thoughts I grasp a subject, but also I will or fear or affirm or deny it

18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / b. Human rationality

4017	Descartes created the modern view of rationality, as an internal feature instead of an external vision [Taylor,C]

18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / b. Error

2284	I make errors because my will extends beyond my understanding

18. Thought / C. Content / 2. Ideas

5685	True ideas are images, such as of a man, a chimera, or God

18. Thought / C. Content / 10. Causal Semantics

3629	All ideas are adventitious, and come from the senses [Gassendi]

18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / c. Nativist concepts

2273	The ideas of God and of my self are innate in me

2285	I can think of innumerable shapes I have never experienced

2286	The idea of a supremely perfect being is within me, like the basic concepts of mathematics

26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / a. Final purpose

2280	Many causes are quite baffling, so it is absurd to deduce causes from final purposes

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation

2272	There must be at least as much in the cause as there is in the effect

28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature

2289	Nothing apart from God could have essential existence, and such a being must be unique and eternal

2269	God the creator is an intelligent, infinite, powerful substance

28. God / A. Divine Nature / 3. Divine Perfections

2275	It is self-evident that deception is a natural defect, so God could not be a deceiver

28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof

2268	One idea leads to another, but there must be an initial idea that contains the reality of all the others

2274	The idea of God in my mind is like the mark a craftsman puts on his work

2287	Existence and God's essence are inseparable, like a valley and a mountain, or a triangle and its properties

2288	I cannot think of a supremely perfect being without the supreme perfection of existence

28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique

3633	We can never conceive of an infinite being [Gassendi]

3632	We mustn't worship God as an image because we have no idea of him [Hobbes]

3638	Existence is not a perfection; it is what makes perfection possible [Gassendi]

5036	Descartes cannot assume that a most perfect being exists without contradictions [Leibniz]

29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / c. Human Error

2277	Since God does not wish to deceive me, my judgement won't make errors if I use it properly

3636	God didn't give us good judgement even about our own lives [Gassendi]

2278	Error arises because my faculty for judging truth is not infinite

29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / d. Natural Evil

2281	If we ask whether God's works are perfect, we must not take a narrow viewpoint, but look at the universe as a whole