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| 9438 | Maybe analysis seeks the 'nominal essence', and metaphysics seeks the 'real essence' [Mumford] |
| 7653 | I am just an under-labourer, clearing the ground in preparation for knowledge |
| 12526 | Opposition to reason is mad |
| 12538 | Genus is a partial conception of species, and species a partial idea of individuals |
| 16797 | Maybe Locke described the real essence of a person [Pasnau] |
| 12573 | Ad Hominem: press a man with the consequences of his own principle |
| 12491 | Asking whether man's will is free is liking asking if sleep is fast or virtue is square |
| 12549 | Nothing is so beautiful to the eye as truth is to the mind |
| 12522 | It is propositions which are true or false, though it is sometimes said of ideas |
| 12523 | If they refer to real substances, 'man' is a true idea and 'centaur' a false one |
| 12558 | Truth only belongs to mental or verbal propositions |
| 8084 | Syllogisms are verbal fencing, not discovery |
| 12572 | Many people can reason well, yet can't make a syllogism |
| 10055 | Mathematical proofs work, irrespective of whether the objects exist |
| 12488 | The idea of 'one' is the simplest, most obvious and most widespread idea |
| 12489 | If there were real infinities, you could add two together, which is ridiculous |
| 12556 | Mathematics is just about ideas, so whether circles exist is irrelevant |
| 7782 | Every simple idea we ever have brings the idea of unity along with it |
| 8910 | General and universal are not real entities, but useful inventions of the mind, concerning words or ideas |
| 12554 | Existences can only be known by experience |
| 12502 | Comparisons boil down to simple elements of sensation or reflection |
| 12568 | God assures me of the existence of external things |
| 12516 | Obscure simple ideas result from poor senses, brief impressions, or poor memory |
| 12517 | Ideas are uncertain when they are unnamed, because too close to other ideas |
| 13435 | We can't categorise things by their real essences, because these are unknown |
| 12535 | If we discovered real essences, we would still categorise things by the external appearance |
| 13436 | There are no gaps in the continuum of nature, and everything has something closely resembling it |
| 12477 | We get the idea of power from our own actions, and the interaction of external bodies |
| 12490 | Power is active or passive, and has a relation to actions |
| 12521 | We can only know a thing's powers when we have combined it with many things |
| 15974 | The essence of whiteness in a man is nothing but the power to produce the idea of whiteness |
| 15976 | What is the texture - the real essence - which makes substances behave in distinct ways? |
| 15983 | Locke explains powers, but effectively eliminates them with his talk of internal structure [Alexander,P] |
| 6487 | Locke, Berkeley and Hume did no serious thinking about universals [Robinson,H] |
| 7717 | All things that exist are particulars |
| 7718 | Universals do not exist, but are useful inventions of the mind, involving words or ideas |
| 12499 | Bodies distinctively have cohesion of parts, and power to communicate motion |
| 1211 | Viewing an object at an instant, we perceive identity when we see it must be that thing and not another |
| 12508 | Living things retain identity through change, by a principle of organisation |
| 12563 | Obviously two bodies cannot be in the same place |
| 12506 | A thing is individuated just by existing at a time and place |
| 12529 | I speak of a 'sortal' name, from the word 'sort' |
| 8546 | Powers are part of our idea of substances |
| 1196 | We can conceive of three sorts of substance: God, finite intelligence, and bodies |
| 12536 | We sort and name substances by nominal and not by real essence |
| 7945 | We think of substance as experienced qualities plus a presumed substratum of support |
| 12485 | We don't know what substance is, and only vaguely know what it does |
| 16796 | Locke may accept coinciding material substances, such as body, man and person [Pasnau] |
| 12507 | A mass consists of its atoms, so the addition or removal of one changes its identity |
| 12559 | Complex ideas are collections of qualities we attach to an unknown substratum |
| 12498 | Particular substances are coexisting ideas that seem to flow from a hidden essence |
| 12520 | The best I can make of real essence is figure, size and connection of solid parts |
| 13771 | Real essence is the constitution of the unknown parts of a body which produce its qualities |
| 16038 | Locke may distinguish real essence from internal constitution, claiming the latter is knowable [Jones,J-E] |
| 12810 | We can conceive an individual without assigning it to a kind [Jolley] |
| 16786 | You can't distinguish individuals without the species as a standard |
| 15992 | Many individuals grouped under one name vary more than some things that have different names |
| 12530 | The less rational view of essences is that they are moulds for kinds of natural thing |
| 12532 | Even real essence depends on a sort, since it is sorts which have the properties |
| 12539 | If every sort has its real essence, one horse, being many sorts, will have many essences |
| 11155 | Essence is the very being of any thing, whereby it is what it is |
| 12510 | Not all identity is unity of substance |
| 12560 | We can only slightly know necessary co-existence of qualities, if they are primary |
| 16787 | Explanatory essence won't do, because it won't distinguish the accidental from the essential [Pasnau] |
| 16028 | Lockean real essence makes a thing what it is, and produces its observable qualities [Jones,J-E] |
| 12305 | Locke's essences determine the other properties, so the two will change together [Copi] |
| 15985 | It is impossible for two things with the same real essence to differ in properties |
| 12534 | We cannot know what properties are necessary to gold, unless we first know its real essence |
| 13434 | In our ideas, the idea of essence is inseparable from the concept of a species |
| 16035 | If we based species on real essences, the individuals would be as indistinguishable as two circles |
| 16036 | Internal constitution doesn't decide a species; should a watch contain four wheels or five? |
| 12540 | Artificial things like watches and pistols have distinct kinds |
| 12537 | To be a nominal essence, a complex idea must exhibit unity |
| 16031 | Real essence explains observable qualities, but not what kind of thing it is [Jones,J-E] |
| 15646 | If essence is 'nominal', artificial gold (with its surface features) would qualify as 'gold' [Eagle] |
| 12306 | 'Nominal essence' is everything contained in the idea of a particular sort of thing [Copi] |
| 15988 | The observable qualities are never the real essence, since they depend on real essence |
| 15644 | In nominal essence, Locke confuses the set of properties with the abstracted idea of them [Eagle] |
| 16029 | Locke's real and nominal essence refers back to Aristotle's real and nominal definitions [Jones,J-E] |
| 12531 | Nominal Essence is the abstract idea to which a name is attached |
| 13433 | Essences relate to sorting words; if you replace those with names, essences vanish |
| 12533 | Real essences are unknown, so only the nominal essence connects things to a species |
| 12557 | Our ideas of substance are based on mental archetypes, but these come from the world |
| 12561 | For 'all gold is malleable' to be necessary, it must be part of gold's nominal essence |
| 12525 | The essence of a triangle is simple; presumably substance essences are similar |
| 13431 | A space between three lines is both the nominal and real essence of a triangle, the source of its properties |
| 13423 | The schools recognised that they don't really know essences, because they couldn't coin names for them |
| 12804 | There are no independent natural kinds - or our classifications have to be subjective [Jolley] |
| 12547 | We know five properties of gold, but cannot use four of them to predict the fifth one |
| 12503 | Identity means that the idea of a thing remains the same over time |
| 12505 | One thing cannot have two beginnings of existence, nor two things one beginning |
| 16795 | Same person, man or substance are different identities, belonging to different ideas |
| 12504 | Two things can't occupy one place and time, which leads us to the idea of self-identity |
| 12553 | Some of our ideas contain relations which we cannot conceive to be absent |
| 12544 | Our knowledge falls short of the extent of our own ideas |
| 12574 | When two ideas agree in my mind, I cannot refuse to see and know it |
| 15995 | The greatest certainty is knowing our own ideas, and that two ideas are different |
| 12562 | General certainty is only found in ideas |
| 12569 | Knowledge by senses is less certain than that by intuition or reason, but it is still knowledge |
| 12564 | I am as certain of the thing doubting, as I am of the doubt |
| 7570 | Innate ideas are trivial (if they are just potentials) or absurd (if they claim infants know a lot) [Jolley] |
| 12472 | If the only test of innateness is knowing, then all of our knowledge is innate |
| 7709 | A proposition can't be in the mind if we aren't conscious of it |
| 4018 | Innate ideas were followed up with innate doctrines, which stopped reasoning and made social control possible |
| 7723 | The senses first let in particular ideas, which furnish the empty cabinet |
| 7507 | The mind is white paper, with no writing, or ideas |
| 12474 | The mind is a blank page, on which only experience can write |
| 12518 | The mind cannot produce simple ideas |
| 12478 | A 'quality' is a power to produce an idea in our minds |
| 15989 | Colours, smells and tastes are ideas; the secondary qualities have no colour, smell or taste [Alexander,P] |
| 15971 | Secondary qualities are powers of complex primary qualities to produce sensations in us |
| 12481 | Hands can report conflicting temperatures, but not conflicting shapes |
| 12546 | We can't know how primary and secondary qualities connect together |
| 6725 | Locke believes matter is an inert, senseless substance, with extension, figure and motion [Berkeley] |
| 15982 | Qualities are named as primary if they are needed for scientific explanation [Alexander,P] |
| 12479 | Primary qualities produce simple ideas, such as solidity, extension, motion and number |
| 12480 | Ideas of primary qualities resemble their objects, but those of secondary qualities don't |
| 7049 | In Locke, the primary qualities are also powers [Heil] |
| 15973 | In my view Locke's 'textures' are groups of corpuscles which are powers (rather than 'having' powers) [Alexander,P] |
| 7050 | I suspect that Locke did not actually believe colours are 'in the mind' [Heil] |
| 15979 | Secondary qualities are simply the bare powers of an object |
| 12482 | Molyneux's Question: could a blind man distinguish cube from sphere, if he regained his sight? |
| 7724 | All the ideas written on the white paper of the mind can only come from one place - experience |
| 12542 | Knowledge is just the connection or disagreement of our ideas |
| 12527 | Some ideas connect together naturally, while others connect by chance or custom |
| 12555 | The constant link between whiteness and things that produce it is the basis of our knowledge |
| 16637 | The absolute boundaries of our thought are the ideas we get from senses and the mind |
| 2793 | It is unclear how identity, equality, perfection, God, power and cause derive from experience [Dancy,J] |
| 12543 | Intuition gives us direct and certain knowledge of what is obvious |
| 19517 | Believing without a reason may just be love of your own fantasies |
| 15977 | Facts beyond immediate experience are assessed by agreement with known truths and observations |
| 2555 | For Locke knowledge relates to objects, not to propositions [Rorty] |
| 10326 | Other men's opinions don't add to our knowledge - even when they are true |
| 6488 | Locke has no patience with scepticism [Robinson,H] |
| 16037 | Locke seems to use real essence for scientific explanation, and substratum for the being of a thing [Jones,J-E] |
| 16032 | To explain qualities, Locke invokes primary and secondary qualities, not real essences [Jones,J-E] |
| 12519 | Gold is supposed to have a real essence, from whence its detectable properties flow |
| 12551 | We are satisfied that other men have minds, from their words and actions |
| 12483 | Unlike humans, animals cannot entertain general ideas |
| 5002 | Consciousness is the perception of what passes in a man's own mind |
| 2603 | If we aren't aware that an idea is innate, the concept of innate is meaningless; if we do, all ideas seem innate |
| 2421 | There is nothing illogical about inverted qualia |
| 3522 | The same object might produce violet in one mind and marigold in another |
| 7721 | Locke's view that thoughts are made of ideas asserts the crucial role of imagination |
| 12476 | Every external object or internal idea suggests to us the idea of unity |
| 12501 | The mind can make a unity out of anything, no matter how diverse |
| 9083 | The mind creates abstractions by generalising about appearances of objects, ignoring time or place |
| 7040 | General words represent general ideas, which are abstractions from immediate circumstances |
| 12528 | If a man sees a friend die in a room, he associates the pain with the room |
| 5512 | Locke uses 'self' for a momentary entity, and 'person' for an extended one [Martin/Barresi] |
| 1202 | A person is intelligent, rational, self-aware, continuous, conscious |
| 1381 | Someone mad then sane is two persons, judging by our laws and punishments |
| 1385 | 'Person' is a term used about responsibility, involving law, and happiness and misery |
| 1372 | Our personal identity must depend on something we are aware of, namely consciousness |
| 1378 | My little finger is part of me if I am conscious of it |
| 5175 | Personal identity is my perceptions, but not my memory, as I forget too much [Ayer] |
| 1363 | Locke's theory confusingly tries to unite consciousness and memory [Reid] |
| 1368 | Locke mistakes similarity of a memory to its original event for identity [Reid] |
| 1373 | Identity over time involves remembering actions just as they happened |
| 1380 | Should we punish people who commit crimes in their sleep? |
| 5511 | For Locke, conscious awareness unifies a person at an instant and over time [Martin/Barresi] |
| 12509 | If the soul individuates a man, and souls are transferable, then a hog could be a man |
| 1376 | Identity must be in consciousness not substance, because it seems transferable |
| 12512 | If someone becomes conscious of Nestor's actions, then he is Nestor |
| 12513 | If a prince's soul entered a cobbler's body, the person would be the prince (and the man the cobbler) |
| 12514 | On Judgement Day, no one will be punished for actions they cannot remember |
| 1397 | Locke sees underlying substance as irrelevant to personal identity [Noonan] |
| 6139 | Locke implies that each thought has two thinkers - me, and 'my' substance [Merricks] |
| 5513 | Two persons might have qualitatively identical consciousnesses, so that isn't enough [Kant] |
| 1345 | Locke's move from substance to consciousness is a slippery slope [Butler] |
| 1197 | No two thoughts at different times can be the same, as they have different beginnings |
| 1364 | Locke confuses the test for personal identity with the thing itself [Reid] |
| 12511 | If consciousness is interrupted, and we forget our past selves, are we still the same thinking thing? |
| 1361 | If identity is consciousness, could a person move between bodies or fragment into parts? [Reid] |
| 21326 | Locke's memory theory of identity confuses personal identity with the test for it [Reid] |
| 1387 | Butler thought Locke's theory was doomed once he rejected mental substance [Perry] |
| 12809 | Nothing about me is essential |
| 3792 | We are free to decide not to follow our desires |
| 12494 | Men are not free to will, because they cannot help willing |
| 12492 | Liberty is a power of agents, so can't be an attribute of wills |
| 12493 | A man is free insofar as he can act according to his own preferences |
| 7840 | For all we know, an omnipotent being might have enabled material beings to think |
| 12500 | Thinking without matter and matter that thinks are equally baffling |
| 15996 | We can't begin to conceive what would produce some particular experience within our minds |
| 12552 | Thoughts moving bodies, and bodies producing thoughts, are equally unknowable |
| 6712 | For Locke, abstract ideas are our main superiority of understanding over animals [Berkeley] |
| 12496 | Complex ideas are all resolvable into simple ideas |
| 15967 | The word 'idea' covers thinking best, for imaginings, concepts, and basic experiences |
| 6486 | Ideas are the objects of understanding when we think |
| 12475 | All our ideas derive either from sensation, or from inner reflection |
| 17735 | Simple ideas are produced in us by external things, and they match their appearances |
| 12471 | Innate ideas are nothing, if they are in the mind but we are unaware of them |
| 5827 | A species of thing is an abstract idea, and a word is a sign that refers to the idea |
| 7716 | Words were devised as signs for inner ideas, and their basic meaning is those ideas |
| 7308 | Words stand for the ideas in the mind of him that uses them |
| 12524 | For the correct reference of complex ideas, we can only refer to experts |
| 15991 | Since words are just conventional, we can represent our own ideas with any words we please |
| 4130 | There couldn't be a moral rule of which a man could not justly demand a reason |
| 12473 | We can demand a reason for any moral rule |
| 12495 | Pursuit of happiness is the highest perfection of intellectual nature |
| 12541 | Morality can be demonstrated, because we know the real essences behind moral words |
| 1386 | A concern for happiness is the inevitable result of consciousness |
| 4019 | Things are good and evil only in reference to pleasure and pain |
| 12515 | Actions are virtuous if they are judged praiseworthy |
| 12548 | It is certain that injustice requires property, since it is a violation of the right to property |
| 15997 | We are so far from understanding the workings of natural bodies that it is pointless to even try |
| 15978 | I take 'matter' to be a body, excluding its extension in space and its shape |
| 15170 | We distinguish species by their nominal essence, not by their real essence |
| 15993 | If we observe total regularity, there must be some unknown law and relationships controlling it |
| 12497 | Causes are the substances which have the powers to produce action |
| 12550 | If we knew the minute mechanics of hemlock, we could predict that it kills men |
| 15966 | Boyle and Locke believed corpuscular structures necessitate their powers of interaction [Alexander,P] |
| 15984 | The corpuscular hypothesis is the best explanation of the necessary connection and co-existence of powers |
| 15950 | We will only understand substance when we know the necessary connections between powers and qualities |
| 7713 | We identify substances by supposing that groups of sensations arise from an essence |
| 12545 | Other spirits may exceed us in knowledge, by knowing the inward constitution of things |
| 12484 | Motion is just change of distance between two things |
| 15986 | Boyle and Locke suspect forces of being occult [Alexander,P] |
| 16685 | An insurmountable force in a body keeps our hands apart when we handle it |
| 15980 | We can locate the parts of the universe, but not the whole thing |
| 12486 | An 'instant' is where we perceive no succession, and is the time of a single idea |
| 12487 | We can never show that two successive periods of time were equal |
| 12567 | It is inconceivable that unthinking matter could produce intelligence |
| 12570 | The finite and dependent should obey the supreme and infinite |
| 12565 | God has given us no innate idea of himself |
| 12566 | We exist, so there is Being, which requires eternal being |
| 12571 | If miracles aim at producing belief, it is plausible that their events are very unusual |