Ideas from 'The Conscious Mind' by David J.Chalmers [1996], by Theme Structure
[found in 'The Conscious Mind' by Chalmers,David J. [OUP 1997,0-19-510553-2]].
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expand these ideas
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
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2392
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Properties supervene if you can't have one without the other
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / b. Types of supervenience
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2393
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Logical supervenience is when one set of properties must be accompanied by another set
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2394
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Natural supervenience is when one set of properties is always accompanied by another set
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
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2398
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Reduction requires logical supervenience
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
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16048
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Physicalism says in any two physically indiscernible worlds the positive facts are the same [Bennett,K]
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7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
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2401
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All facts are either physical, experiential, laws of nature, second-order final facts, or indexical facts about me
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10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
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16425
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Metaphysical necessity is a bizarre, brute and inexplicable constraint on possibilities
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16424
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Strong metaphysical necessity allows fewer possible worlds than logical necessity
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10. Modality / A. Necessity / 10. Impossibility
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16426
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How can we know the metaphysical impossibilities; the a posteriori only concerns this world
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10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
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13956
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Kripke is often taken to be challenging a priori insights into necessity
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10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
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13963
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Maybe logical possibility does imply conceivability - by an ideal mind
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10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
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2407
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One can wrongly imagine two things being non-identical even though they are the same (morning/evening star)
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11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
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2390
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We attribute beliefs to people in order to explain their behaviour
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12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
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2397
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'Perception' means either an action or a mental state
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12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
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2422
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The structure of the retina has already simplified the colour information which hits it
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
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2396
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Reductive explanation is not the be-all and the end-all of explanation
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15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
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2426
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Why are minds homogeneous and brains fine-grained?
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15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness
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2391
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Can we be aware but not conscious?
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15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / d. Purpose of consciousness
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2412
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Can we explain behaviour without consciousness?
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15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness
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2386
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Hard Problem: why brains experience things
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2416
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What turns awareness into consciousness?
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2423
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Going down the scale, where would consciousness vanish?
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15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 3. Privacy
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2403
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Nothing in physics even suggests consciousness
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15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
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2400
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Is intentionality just causal connections?
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15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
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2389
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Sometimes we don't notice our pains
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2419
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Why should qualia fade during silicon replacement?
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15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 6. Inverted Qualia
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2402
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It seems possible to invert qualia
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15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 7. Blindsight
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2415
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In blindsight both qualia and intentionality are missing
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16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 4. Errors in Introspection
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2414
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When distracted we can totally misjudge our own experiences
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17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
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2409
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Maybe dualist interaction is possible at the quantum level?
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2411
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Supervenience makes interaction laws possible
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17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 3. Panpsychism
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2424
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It is odd if experience is a very recent development
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17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 7. Zombies
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2413
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If I can have a zombie twin, my own behaviour doesn't need consciousness
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17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 3. Psycho-Functionalism
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2417
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Does consciousness arise from fine-grained non-reductive functional organisation?
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17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 7. Chinese Room
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2428
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Maybe the whole Chinese Room understands Chinese, though the person doesn't
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17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
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2418
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The Chinese Mind doesn't seem conscious, but then nor do brains from outside
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17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
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2406
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H2O causes liquidity, but no one is a dualist about that
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17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 4. Emergentism
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2405
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Perhaps consciousness is physically based, but not logically required by that base
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17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
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2395
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Zombies imply natural but not logical supervenience
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17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 6. Mysterianism
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9318
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Phenomenal consciousness is fundamental, with no possible nonphenomenal explanation [Kriegel/Williford]
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2404
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Nothing external shows whether a mouse is conscious
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
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2429
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Temperature (etc.) is agreed to be reducible, but it is multiply realisable
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18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 9. Indexical Thought
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18403
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Indexicals may not be objective, but they are a fact about the world as I see it
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics
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14708
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Rationalist 2D semantics posits necessary relations between meaning, apriority, and possibility [Schroeter]
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13958
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The 'primary intension' is non-empirical, and fixes extensions based on the actual-world reference
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2399
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Meaning has split into primary ("watery stuff"), and secondary counterfactual meaning ("H2O")
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13959
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The 'secondary intension' is determined by rigidifying (as H2O) the 'water' picked out in the actual world
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13957
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Primary and secondary intensions are the a priori (actual) and a posteriori (counterfactual) aspects of meaning
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13961
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We have 'primary' truth-conditions for the actual world, and derived 'secondary' ones for counterfactual worlds
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19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
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13962
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Two-dimensional semantics gives a 'primary' and 'secondary' proposition for each statement
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19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
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13960
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In two-dimensional semantics we have two aspects to truth in virtue of meaning
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28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions
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16427
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Presumably God can do anything which is logically possible
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