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| 21642 | If quantification is all substitutional, there is no ontology |
| Full Idea: Ontology is meaningless for a theory whose only quantification is substitutionally construed. | |||
| From: Willard Quine (Ontological Relativity [1968], p.64), quoted by Thomas Hofweber - Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics 03.5.1 n18 | |||
| A reaction: Hofweber views it as none the worse for that, since clearly lots of quantification has no ontological commitment at all. But he says it is rightly called 'a nominalists attempt at a free lunch'. |
| 1633 | Absolute ontological questions are meaningless, because the answers are circular definitions |
| Full Idea: What makes ontological questions meaningless when taken absolutely is not universality but circularity. A question of the form "What is an F?" can only be answered with "An F is a G", which makes sense relative to the uncritical acceptance of G. | |||
| From: Willard Quine (Ontological Relativity [1968], p.53) | |||
| A reaction: This is too precise. No one takes such questions wholly as 'absolutes', but we don't accept G uncritically. We keep going, and the target is not a foundation, but coherence. |
| 18964 | Ontology is relative to both a background theory and a translation manual |
| Full Idea: Ontology is doubly relative. Specifying the universe of a theory makes sense only relative to some background theory, and only relative to some choice of a manual of translation of one theory into another. | |||
| From: Willard Quine (Ontological Relativity [1968], p.54) | |||
| A reaction: People tend to forget about the double nature of Quine's notion of ontological commitment, and usually only talk about the commitment of the theory being employed. Why is the philosophical community not devoting itself to the study of tranlation manuals? |
| 18965 | We know what things are by distinguishing them, so identity is part of ontology |
| Full Idea: We cannot know what something is without knowing how it is marked off from other things. Identity is thus of a piece with ontology. | |||
| From: Willard Quine (Ontological Relativity [1968], p.55) | |||
| A reaction: Actually it is failure of identity which seems to raise questions of individuation. If I say 'this apple is [pause] identical to this apple', I don't see how that helps me to individuate apples. |
| 1634 | Two things are relative - the background theory, and translating the object theory into the background theory |
| Full Idea: Relativity has two components: to the choice of a background theory, and to the choice of how to translate the object theory into the background theory. | |||
| From: Willard Quine (Ontological Relativity [1968], p.67) |
| 8470 | Reference is inscrutable, because we cannot choose between theories of numbers |
| Full Idea: For Quine, we cannot sensibly ask which is the real number five, the Frege-Russell set or the Von Neumann one. There is no arithmetical or empirical way of deciding between the two. Reference is inscrutable. | |||
| From: report of Willard Quine (Ontological Relativity [1968]) by Alex Orenstein - W.V. Quine Ch.3 | |||
| A reaction: To generalise from a problem of reference in the highly abstract world of arithmetic, and say that all reference is inscrutable, strikes me as implausible. |
| 18963 | Indeterminacy translating 'rabbit' depends on translating individuation terms |
| Full Idea: The indeterminacy between 'rabbit', 'rabbit stage' and the rest depended only on a correlative indeterminacy of translation of the English apparatus of individuation - pronouns, plurals, identity, numerals and so on. | |||
| From: Willard Quine (Ontological Relativity [1968], p.35) | |||
| A reaction: This spells out the problem a little better than in 'Word and Object'. I just don't believe these problems are intractable. Quine is like a child endlessly asking 'why?'. |