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| 24343 | The people think philosophers should never lie, because only the truthful know truth |
| Full Idea: The people demand from a philosopher that he not lie: for they believe that only the truthful can recognise the truth. | |||
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Fragments from 1886-87 (v 17) [1887], 5[033]) | |||
| A reaction: I would say that no one could be a philosopher if they are not appalled by unnecessary lies. I get the slight impression that Nietzsche doesn't agree. He probably had a different concept of lying. |
| 24342 | The people are too remote from wisdom to understand it |
| Full Idea: The people have, justifiably, the falsest concept of the circumstances from which they are most distant - of wisdom. | |||
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Fragments from 1886-87 (v 17) [1887], 5[030]) | |||
| A reaction: Presumably the people are too trapped in ossified conventions of thought. I'm not sure how Nietzsche understood wisdom. |
| 24362 | You need to be narrow-minded to have a system |
| Full Idea: I am not narrow-minded enough for a system - not even for my system… | |||
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Fragments from 1886-87 (v 17) [1887], 10[146]) | |||
| A reaction: Ooh! Is this a confession that he actually has a system, but his mind keeps wandering away from it? I agree with John Richardson that Nietzsche has a system. This is a nice insult aimed at systematisers (like me!). |
| 24356 | Might apparent objectivity just be a different degree within subjectivity? |
| Full Idea: The apparent objective character of things; could it not just be a difference of degree within the subjective? | |||
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Fragments from 1886-87 (v 17) [1887], 9[040]) | |||
| A reaction: I'm a fan of objectivity, but I accept that it comes in degrees, and that perfect objectivity is impossible. I think a strong consensus of Nietzchean 'perspectives' could add up to a high degree of objectivity. |
| 24341 | Thinking is only possible with linguistic contraints, and reasoning is trapped in a schema |
| Full Idea: We cease to think when we do not want to do it within linguistic contraints. …Rational thought is an interpreting according to a schema that we are unable to shake off. | |||
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Fragments from 1886-87 (v 17) [1887], 5[022]) | |||
| A reaction: Most people think Wittgenstein was the first to entertain such ideas. Both thinkers fail to acknowledge that we can extend the language, and push the boundaries of the schema. And a lot of good thinking is non-linguistic. |
| 24354 | Won't philosophy eventually reveal the presuppositions of reason? |
| Full Idea: Must not all philosophy finally bring to light the presuppositions on which the movement of reason rests? | |||
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Fragments from 1886-87 (v 17) [1887], 7[63]) | |||
| A reaction: Probably not, I would say! If reason itself becomes unavailable as a tool of research (because it is now the object of that research), I don't see any alternative tools for the job. Nietzsche (I think) only only offers 'instinct' to oppose reason. |
| 24338 | If proof is the criterion of truth, that criterion is arbitrary, and cannot be proven |
| Full Idea: 'What allows itself to be proven, is true'. That is an arbitrary determination of the concept 'true' which does not allow itself to be proven. | |||
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Fragments from 1886-87 (v 17) [1887], 5[018]) | |||
| A reaction: This criticism seems to anticipate the views of Hilbert and Brouwer on such things. No theory of truth can be proven within a language, and hence the later move to meta-languages. I favour the axiomatic approach to truth. |
| 24339 | We believe in realities that affect us, and 'being' is where we detect activity |
| Full Idea: The more our interest is touched the more we believe in the reality of a thing. …The 'being' is thus understood by us as that which acts upon us, that which proves itself through its activity. | |||
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Fragments from 1886-87 (v 17) [1887], 5[019]) | |||
| A reaction: Nietzsche is not an anti-realist. These comments are about 'the world that concerns us'. I see no reason why we should not speculate about being which does not affect us, and especially if it figures in complex explanations. What care I of quarks? |
| 24355 | We commit to being (rather than becoming) only because we need stable beliefs |
| Full Idea: As we must maintain stability in our beliefs in order to flourish, we've made it up that the 'true' world is not one of change and becoming, but is one of being. | |||
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Fragments from 1886-87 (v 17) [1887], 9[038]) | |||
| A reaction: So if we commit, with Nietzsche, to becoming (rather than being) we will no longer have any stable beliefs, and hence we won't flourish. Thanks a lot, FN! Unless we can have stable beliefs about becoming… In its patterns? |
| 24347 | Plato's reversal said the more value the more reality, and the more 'idea' the more being |
| Full Idea: Platonism boasted a bold reversal. He measured the degree of reality according to the degree of value, and said: the more 'idea' the more being. | |||
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Fragments from 1886-87 (v 17) [1887], 7[02]) | |||
| A reaction: The second part seems to be a sliding scale of idealism. The highest values are the most real, but the Good in particular is very vague and undetermined. You then have the problem of people with unhealthy values. |
| 24352 | The world is knowable up to a point, but there are many interpretations |
| Full Idea: So far as the word 'knowledge' has meaning at all, the world is knowable: but the world can be interpreted otherwise, it has no meaning behind it, rather innumerable meanings "Perspectivism" | |||
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Fragments from 1886-87 (v 17) [1887], 7[60]) | |||
| A reaction: Premonition of Putnam's account in model theory of how many models are possible for any theory. I disagree. It seems to me obvious that 'knowledge' can be assigned a sharp meaning, and that we know lots of things. Most perspectives are indistinguishable. |
| 24351 | The question of values is prior to the question of certainty |
| Full Idea: The question of values is more fundamental than the question of certainty: the latter obtains its gravity only on the presupposition that the question of value has been answered. | |||
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Fragments from 1886-87 (v 17) [1887], 7[48]) | |||
| A reaction: I think that nowadays most people, and notably scientists, have given up the pursuit of certainty - so Nietzsche has won this battle. If values label what is important, then they are self-evidently the first question in any enquiry. |
| 24363 | The Cogito means assuming substances, and a grammatical convention assigning doers to deeds |
| Full Idea: [The Cogito] means positing our belief in the concept of substance as 'true a priori': that if thinking occurs there must be something 'that thinks' is, however, simply a formulation of our grammatical convention that assigns a doer to each deed. | |||
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Fragments from 1886-87 (v 17) [1887], 10[158]) | |||
| A reaction: He says the Cogito is not a certainty, but just 'an intensely strong belief'. The idea that it is just a linguistic convention anticipates a common twentieth century criticism. |
| 24344 | We couldn't survive having much stronger or weaker senses |
| Full Idea: If we sharpened or dulled our senses by a factor of ten, we would perish. | |||
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Fragments from 1886-87 (v 17) [1887], 5[036]) | |||
| A reaction: Hm. We survive looking through telescopes and microscopes. I think I could cope with hearing mice breathing, though I suppose I would then be overloaded with sensations. He must be roughly right about this. |
| 24349 | Single judgements are never 'true', because that needs coherent support |
| Full Idea: A single judgment is never 'true', never cognition, surety first comes about in coherency, in the relationship of many judgments. | |||
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Fragments from 1886-87 (v 17) [1887], 7[04]) | |||
| A reaction: [Is this Nietzsche's view, or Kant's?] If a single judgment were surrounded by coherent support, then we would judge the single judgment to be true. I hope this is Nietzsche supporting coherentism. It would fit his perspectivalism. |
| 24337 | Sciences are precise about what is superficial, and thus explore impoverished parts of existence |
| Full Idea: Scientific exactitude is first attained in cases of the most superficial appearances; where one can count, calculate, touch, see, where quantities can be ascertained. Thus the most impoverished areas of existence have been fruitfully cultivated first. | |||
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Fragments from 1886-87 (v 17) [1887], 5[016]) | |||
| A reaction: The advent of computers, and even AI, have just accelerated this process. Statistical methods dominate social thinking. Thus accountants dominate our education system. |
| 24336 | Intellects cannot critically self-examine, because no comparisons can be made |
| Full Idea: The intellect cannot critically examine itself precisely because it cannot be compared with other intellects of dissimilar natures. | |||
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Fragments from 1886-87 (v 17) [1887], 5[011]) | |||
| A reaction: There is obviously an assumption that understanding always needs comparisons. This entails that nothing unique can ever be understood, which seems dubious. An interesting thought, though. Try applying it to yourself. |
| 24358 | If something is regular and calculable, that doesn't mean it is necessary |
| Full Idea: That something regularly and calculably takes place does not consequently imply that it necessarily takes place. | |||
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Fragments from 1886-87 (v 17) [1887], 9[091]) | |||
| A reaction: I strongly deny this fixed idea that the only alternative to free will is something called 'determinism'. That is a quite separate issue. I like Nietzsche's thought. |
| 24364 | Enthusiasts' Nature is Christian ideals, of freedom, goodness, innocence, equity, justice |
| Full Idea: The soft and cowardly concept 'nature' introduced by enthusiasts …is an attempt to read from nature that moral-Christian Rouseauian 'humanity', as if Nature were freedom, goodness, innocence, equity, justice, idyll, at base a cult of Christian morality. | |||
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Fragments from 1886-87 (v 17) [1887], 10[170]) | |||
| A reaction: Pastoral poetry has a much longer history. 'King Lear' is the great debate about the values in nature. I guess 'the pcturesque' is Nietzsche's target here. |
| 24340 | When we are affected by values, we have forgotten that we created them |
| Full Idea: Suppose that we place certain values in things, then these values have an effect back upon us, once we have forgotten that we were the givers. | |||
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Fragments from 1886-87 (v 17) [1887], 5[019]) | |||
| A reaction: This seems to be a problem in the whole of human culture - that we reify and objectify all sorts of things which we created. New generations have entirely lost touch with the creative acts. Fractions, for example. |
| 24361 | It is naïve to posit any one value from consciousness as the highest value |
| Full Idea: It is naivety to posit pleasure or spirituality or morality or any single particular from the sphere of consciousness as the highest value. | |||
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Fragments from 1886-87 (v 17) [1887], 10[137]) | |||
| A reaction: His main reason is that we overrate what is conscious. I agree. I see myself less and less as a primarily conscious being. Just watch yourself while you cook a meal or drive a car. You are highly rational, but consciousness is a small part. |
| 24350 | Should I value my neighbour higher than me, and my neighbour value me higher than themselves? |
| Full Idea: What does it mean that the well-being of my neighbour should be of higher value to me than my own? That, however, the neighbour should assess the value of his well-being other than I do, namely that he should simply place my well-being above it? | |||
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Fragments from 1886-87 (v 17) [1887], 7[06]) | |||
| A reaction: Has Nietzsche fallen into the Kantian trap that says morality should be consistent. This idea is what I call the 'paradox of altruism', that everyone values others higher than themselves, and also that suffering is what promotes altruism. |
| 24360 | The virtuous are not persons, because they conform to a fixed scheme for life |
| Full Idea: A virtuous human is a lower species because he is not a 'person', but rather he takes his value from conforming to a schema of the human that is set out once and for all. | |||
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Fragments from 1886-87 (v 17) [1887], 10[085]) | |||
| A reaction: This is a standard objection to virtue theory - that it is too conservative, because the virtues are socially determined. I can't see why 'higher' beings can't develop their own virtues. The historical figures Nietzsche admires have distinctive virtues. |
| 24345 | We have nihilism now, because what seems the only possible interpretation has collapsed |
| Full Idea: Nihilism appears now …because one interpretation collapsed; because it was deemed the interpretation, it seems as if there is utterly no meaning in existence, as if everything is in vain. | |||
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Fragments from 1886-87 (v 17) [1887], 5[071].4) | |||
| A reaction: One can imagine such a feeling in German Nazis in 1945, or Russian communists in 1989. Collapses are quick, but rebuildings are very slow. |
| 24365 | What divides us from Christian values is respect for even non-virtuous humans |
| Full Idea: Respect for humans, and in fact decidedly not merely for virtuous humans, is perhaps the element that divides us most strongly from a Christian valuation. | |||
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Fragments from 1886-87 (v 17) [1887], 10[176]) | |||
| A reaction: Christianity does at least value the salvation of every individual soul, but we are all degraded by intrinsic sin. I classify this under 'liberalism', which may not fit Nietzsche's elitism, because I take respect to be the defining liberal value. |
| 24346 | We need many nations, to produce a world-perspective |
| Full Idea: As many international powers as possible - to put into practice the world-perspective. | |||
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Fragments from 1886-87 (v 17) [1887], 5[084]) | |||
| A reaction: An original view of world affairs, which deserves serious consideration. But huge states produce a few huge wars, and lots of little states produce lots of little wars? Still, if liberalism promotes intellectual creativity, so should this suggestion. |
| 24359 | Crime is a rebellion against social order, so punishment should be the quelling of rebels |
| Full Idea: Crime belongs to the concept 'rebellion against the social order'. One does not punish a rebel, one suppresses him. …The concept of punishment should be reduced to the concept of quelling a rebellion. | |||
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Fragments from 1886-87 (v 17) [1887], 10[050]) | |||
| A reaction: This seems to fit the actual practice of the law quite accurately. Recently we have pounced on rebels against the oil industry, or against defenders of Israel, even when they do little actual harm. |
| 24353 | We should avoid the idea of the unity of everything, because we then give it godlike authority |
| Full Idea: It seems important to me, that one rid oneself of the all, the unity, any sort of force, an unconditioned; one would not be able to avoid taking it as the highest authority and baptising it God. | |||
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Fragments from 1886-87 (v 17) [1887], 7[62]) | |||
| A reaction: I don't see much sign that any Greeks after Parmenides saw the One as a god, because it lacks all movement. I also doubt whether a fully unified physics will culminate in a religion. Don't panic, Friedrich. |
| 24357 | The second Buddhism was a nihilistic catastrophe |
| Full Idea: The second Buddhism was a nihilistic catastrophe that put an end to Indian culture. | |||
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Fragments from 1886-87 (v 17) [1887], 9[082]) | |||
| A reaction: He goes on to give some of his reasons. Less knowledgeable people (such as myself) tend to see Buddhism as a single movement, so I find this interesting. I often see a nihilistic strain in eastern thought. The recipe for life: don't think or act. |