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| 24114 | The pain in truth is when it destroys a belief |
| Full Idea: The truth hurts because it destroys a belief: not in itself. | |||
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1882-84 [1883], 9[48]) | |||
| A reaction: There are hideous events, about which it can be dreadful to learn the truth, but the unpleasantness is in the fact, not in the truth of the fact. So, yes. |
| 24104 | We don't create logic, time and space! The mind obeys laws because they are true |
| Full Idea: That which is logical, time, space would have to be produced by us: nonsense! When the mind obeys its own laws, this is because they are actually true, true in themselves! …An error with respect to these truths avenges itself. | |||
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1882-84 [1883], 7[023]) | |||
| A reaction: So much for those who see Nietzsche as the embodiment of relativism. This is Nietzsche standing up to what I increasingly see as the pernicious influence of Kant. I agree with Nietzsche. Relations with the world keep our logic honest. |
| 24112 | To think about being we must have an opinion about what it is |
| Full Idea: We are in the process of figuring out the being of things: consequently we must already have an opinion as to what being is. This can be an error! E.g., I. | |||
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1882-84 [1883], 9[41]) | |||
| A reaction: The point of 'I' is that we unquestioningly think the self is a given aspect of being, as in Descartes. |
| 24115 | There is no proof that we forget things - only that we can't recall |
| Full Idea: That forgetting exists has never yet been demonstrated, but only that many things do not occur to us when we want them to. | |||
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1882-84 [1883], 12[1]123) | |||
| A reaction: There is now quite a lot of evidence that there innumerable memories buried in that mind that we seem unable to directly recall. He is right that we can hardly demonstrate this negative fact. |
| 24099 | We contain many minds, which fight for the 'I' of the mind |
| Full Idea: Many minds are housed within humans like creatures of the sea - they battle one another for the mind 'I'. | |||
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1882-84 [1883], 4[207]) | |||
| A reaction: I am happy to use the word 'I' for the sense of central control of focus and choice, but there doesn's seem to be an actual organ of the Self, so it is a fiction, but one which reflects the general picture of what happens. I can pick a drive to foster. |
| 24102 | Thoughts are signs (just as words are) |
| Full Idea: Thoughts are merely signs, as words are signs for thoughts. | |||
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1882-84 [1883], 5[1]272) | |||
| A reaction: The obvious question he invites is 'signs of what?'. His point must be that most thinking is both non-verbal and non-conscious, which he took to be true even of intellectual thought. I sympathise with his view. |
| 24120 | Great orators lead their arguments, rather than following them |
| Full Idea: For me there are no true orators and super-orators unless they can convince the arguments themselves to run after them. | |||
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1882-84 [1883], 22[01]) | |||
| A reaction: I translate this as great orators generating the mere appearance of good arguments. Both reason and feeling must be irrationally swept along. Nice. |
| 24097 | The pragmatics of language is more comprehensible than the meaning |
| Full Idea: The most comprehensible part of language is not the word itself, but rather tone, force, modulation, tempo, with which a series of words is spoken. | |||
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1882-84 [1883], 3[296]) | |||
| A reaction: He exaggerates. If you watch someone talking vociferously in an unknown foreign language, the feeling of the exchange is obvious, but the content is quite unknown. I see his point that we underestimate body language etc. |
| 24108 | Actions are just a release of force. They seize on something, which becomes the purpose |
| Full Idea: What is the source of actions? For what purpose? …People do not act for happiness, utility or pleasure. Rather, a certain amount of force is released. Seizes on something on which it can vent itself. 'Goal' and 'purpose' are the means for this process. | |||
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1882-84 [1883], 7[077]) | |||
| A reaction: Surprised at how little Nietzsche is discussed in modern theoretical accounts of action. I'm not sure what the evolutionary value might be of a blind force that produces action before its purpose has been decided. Not convinced. What triggers the force? |
| 24105 | Drives make us feel non-feelings; Will is the effect of those feelings |
| Full Idea: 'Drive' is only a translation from the language of nonfeeling into the language of feeling. 'Will' is what is communicated to our feelings as a result of that process - in other words an effect, and not the beginning and cause. | |||
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1882-84 [1883], 7[025]) | |||
| A reaction: This shows the link between his central idea of 'drives' in psychology, and the actions that result. Effectively this makes all our actions arise from the unconscious. Intention and choice are effectively epiphenomena. |
| 24117 | We need lower and higher drives, but they must be under firm control |
| Full Idea: All lower drives must be present and have fresh force if the highest ones want to exist and exist in abundance: but control of the whole must be in firm hands! otherwise the danger is too great. | |||
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1882-84 [1883], 14[03]) | |||
| A reaction: This is unusual, because he speaks of the Self as little more than the currently dominant drive, but here he postulates a controller of the drives, a ringmaster. A-krasia means lack of control. Nietzsche wants en-krateia. |
| 24113 | Our motives don't explain our actions |
| Full Idea: Human actions can in no way be explained by reference to human motives. | |||
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1882-84 [1883], 9[43]) | |||
| A reaction: He takes motives to come after the event. His view seems to be that our actions are deeply inexplicable. But if we explain why we performed some action, are we all and always lying? We give reasons, even if we don't know the source of the reasons. |
| 24121 | Greeks might see modern analysis of what is human as impious |
| Full Idea: Perhaps a Greek would experience the way we have delved deeply in uncovering what is human to be an impiety against nature, a shameless act. | |||
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1882-84 [1883], 34[01]) | |||
| A reaction: Three instances come to mind: Vesalius, Kant and Darwin. That is, anatomical dissection, deep and critical introspection, and natural selection. Human dissection was certainly a Greek taboo. |
| 24107 | Once a drive controls the intellect, it rules, and sets the goals |
| Full Idea: Once it has taken control of the intellect, every single human drive probably demands to be recognised as the ultimate lord and goal-setter of all human matters. | |||
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1882-84 [1883], 7[057]) | |||
| A reaction: This is the best line of attack against the view I like, that human values arise out of the central functions of human nature. It is roughly the existential objection. Is all intellect controlled by some drive, or can intellect seize control of a drive? |
| 24101 | We always assign values, but we may not value those values |
| Full Idea: It is impossible to live without assigning value: but it is possible to live without assigning value to what you value. | |||
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1882-84 [1883], 5[1]186) | |||
| A reaction: True. In my terminology, we can't live without thinking some things are more important than others. But that is compatible with not assigning much importance to anything. |
| 24111 | Happiness is the active equilibrium of our drives |
| Full Idea: Happiness would be the equilibrium of the triggering activities of all the drives. | |||
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1882-84 [1883], 7[260]) | |||
| A reaction: For Nietzsche, only the 'highest' sort of human being could achieve such happiness. I can certainly see that there is happiness when a person is fully focused on something that seems worth doing. |
| 24109 | Actual morality is more complicated and subtle than theory (which gets paralysed) |
| Full Idea: Actual morality is infinitely more subtle, more complicated, more thoughtful than theoretical morality: the latter still stands awkward and embarrassed at the starting point. | |||
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1882-84 [1883], 7[202]) | |||
| A reaction: Glad to find an explicit endorsement of particularism in Nietzsche, since so much of his discussion points that way. |
| 24110 | Some things we would never do, even for the highest ideals |
| Full Idea: There are actions that we will never allow ourselves to engage in, not even as a means to the noblest end e.g., betraying a friend. | |||
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1882-84 [1883], 7[241]) | |||
| A reaction: Jean Genet made a point of betraying his friends. I wonder why Nietzsche thinks we should not betray our friends? Being Nietzsche, he will certainly have asked the question. |
| 24103 | You should not want too many virtues; one is enough |
| Full Idea: You should not want to have too many virtues. One virtue is already a lot of virtue. | |||
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1882-84 [1883], 5[18]) | |||
| A reaction: A typically challenging thought from the great maverick of philosophy. Which virtue would you choose? Do some virtues entail further virtues? |
| 24106 | Talk of 'utility' presupposes that what is useful to people has been defined |
| Full Idea: All this chat about 'utility' already presupposes that what is useful to people has been defined: in other words, useful for what! i.e. the people's purposes are already taken for granted. | |||
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1882-84 [1883], 7[030]) | |||
| A reaction: When they stopped talking about utility they talked instead about 'benefit', but the same objection applies. This is the problem of paternalism in Utilitarianism, which leads to Preference Utilitarianism, which probably doesn't help. |
| 24123 | My eternal recurrence is opposed to feeling fragmented and imperfect |
| Full Idea: I held up eternal recurrence against the numbing feeling of general disintegration and imperfection. | |||
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1882-84 [1883], 24[28]) | |||
| A reaction: I've heard people say that they think Nietzsche was a nihilist. This is nonsense. His whole career was an opposition to nihilism. His excitement over the idea of recurrence is that he sees a real answer to nihilism. You have to value a recurring life. |
| 24119 | The eternal return of wastefulness is a terrible thought |
| Full Idea: The most terrible thought of an eternal return of wastefulness. | |||
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1882-84 [1883], 20[02]) | |||
| A reaction: This illuminates quite well his notion of eternal recurrence. Not only what you would do in an eternally recurring life, but what you would avoid. |
| 24116 | Justice says people are not equal, and should become increasingly unequal |
| Full Idea: People are not equal: thus speaks justice. …Humans should keep becoming ever more unequal. | |||
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1882-84 [1883], 12[43]) | |||
| A reaction: Important to add a little dash of Nietzsche to the widespread modern mantras about equality. We must at least question the extent to which equality should be our aim. (Personally I am an egalitarian liberal). |
| 24098 | Reasons that justify punishment can also justify the crime |
| Full Idea: The reasons used to justify the punishment for a crime can also be used to justify the crime. | |||
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1882-84 [1883], 3[312]) | |||
| A reaction: A splendid observation, even if it is not wholly true. The justification of capital punishment appeals in some way to the whole of society, but a murderer could hardly do that. |
| 24118 | Do away with punishment. Counter-retribution is as bad as the crime |
| Full Idea: My programme: do away with punishment: for us. Counter-retribution is nonsense. (If something is evil, then whoever performs the counter-retribution is certainly committing the same evil). | |||
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1882-84 [1883], 16[17]) | |||
| A reaction: Note that he seems to have a perfectly orthodox concept of 'evil' here. I don't think he ever suggested a strategy to replace punishment. |
| 24100 | If you don't want war, remove your borders; but you set up borders because you want war |
| Full Idea: You are waging war? You fear your neighbour? So remove the border markers: then you will have no more neighbours. But you want war: and that's why you set up the border markers in the first place. | |||
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1882-84 [1883], 5[1]145) | |||
| A reaction: The only reason to demarcate some territory is to keep other people out of it, which is a first act of gentle hostility. The European Union is trying to gradually dismantle the borders. Nietzsche had a creepy liking for war. |
| 24096 | Unlike time, space is subjective. Empty space was assumed, but it doesn't exist |
| Full Idea: Space, like matter, is a subjective form. Time is not. Space first emerged through the assumption of empty space. This doesn't exist. Force is everything. | |||
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1882-84 [1883], 1[003]) | |||
| A reaction: I would think modern physics endorses his opinion of space. The original atomists proposed a 'void', to prevent traffic jams of atoms. Now we see space as fields, so it is never empty. |
| 24122 | Life is forces conjoined by nutrition, to produce resistance, arrangement and value |
| Full Idea: A multiplicity of forces, conjoined through a common nutritive process, is what we call 'life'. All so-called feeling, representing, thinking is part of this nutritive process to enable resistance to other forces, and arrangement, and an evaluation. | |||
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1882-84 [1883], 24[14]) | |||
| A reaction: [compressed at the end] Since no one else seems able to define life, this is quite a good attempt. Life is certainly a sort of unification of active energies, which than share goals. |