Ideas from 'Travels in Four Dimensions' by Robin Le Poidevin [2003], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Travels in Four Dimensions' by Le Poidevin,Robin [OUP 2003,0-19-875255-5]].
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7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / d. Non-being
22919
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A thing which makes no difference seems unlikely to exist
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
22926
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In addition to causal explanations, they can also be inferential, or definitional, or purposive
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 9. Indexical Semantics
22932
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We don't just describe a time as 'now' from a private viewpoint, but as a fact about the world
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
22927
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The logical properties of causation are asymmetry, transitivity and irreflexivity
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27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 3. Points in Space
22922
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We can identify unoccupied points in space, so they must exist
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22924
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If spatial points exist, then they must be stationary, by definition
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27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 4. Substantival Space
22923
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Absolute space explains actual and potential positions, and geometrical truths
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27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 5. Relational Space
22928
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For relationists moving an object beyond the edge of space creates new space
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27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 6. Space-Time
22931
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We distinguish time from space, because it passes, and it has a unique present moment
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27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / e. Eventless time
22917
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Since nothing occurs in a temporal vacuum, there is no way to measure its length
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22921
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Temporal vacuums would be unexperienced, unmeasured, and unending
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27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / b. Rate of time
22934
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Time can't speed up or slow down, so it doesn't seem to be a 'process'
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27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / f. Tenseless (B) series
22938
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To say that the past causes the present needs them both to be equally real
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22940
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If the B-universe is eternal, why am I trapped in a changing moment of it?
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22939
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The B-series doesn't seem to allow change
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27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / g. Time's arrow
22947
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An ordered series can be undirected, but time favours moving from earlier to later
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22952
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If time's arrow is causal, how can there be non-simultaneous events that are causally unconnected?
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22953
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Time's arrow is not causal if there is no temporal gap between cause and effect
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22951
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If time's arrow is psychological then different minds can impose different orders on events
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22948
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There are Thermodynamic, Psychological and Causal arrows of time
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22949
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Presumably if time's arrow is thermodynamic then time ends when entropy is complete
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22950
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If time is thermodynamic then entropy is necessary - but the theory says it is probable
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27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / i. Time and motion
22943
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Instantaneous motion is an intrinsic disposition to be elsewhere
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22945
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The dynamic view of motion says it is primitive, and not reducible to objects, properties and times
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27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / k. Temporal truths
22937
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If the present could have diverse pasts, then past truths can't have present truthmakers
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27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / a. Beginning of time
22925
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The present is the past/future boundary, so the first moment of time was not present
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27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / c. Intervals
22944
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The primitive parts of time are intervals, not instants
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27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / e. Present moment
22942
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If time is infinitely divisible, then the present must be infinitely short
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27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 10. Multiverse
22946
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The multiverse is distinct time-series, as well as spaces
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28. God / A. Divine Nature / 5. God and Time
22941
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How could a timeless God know what time it is? So could God be both timeless and omniscient?
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