Ideas from 'Mere Possibilities' by Robert C. Stalnaker [2012], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Mere Possibilities' by Stalnaker,Robert C. [Princeton 2012,978-0-691-14712-3]].
green numbers give full details |
back to texts
|
expand these ideas
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
|
16440
|
I don't think Lewis's cost-benefit reflective equilibrium approach offers enough guidance
|
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / a. Systems of modal logic
|
16468
|
Non-S5 can talk of contingent or necessary necessities
|
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / b. Axiom of Extensionality I
|
16449
|
In modal set theory, sets only exist in a possible world if that world contains all of its members
|
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
|
16464
|
We regiment to get semantic structure, for evaluating arguments, and understanding complexities
|
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / e. or
|
16465
|
In 'S was F or some other than S was F', the disjuncts need S, but the whole disjunction doesn't
|
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
|
16439
|
A nominalist view says existence is having spatio-temporal location
|
|
16434
|
Some say what exists must do so, and nothing else could possible exist
|
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
|
16443
|
Properties are modal, involving possible situations where they are exemplified
|
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
|
16471
|
I accept a hierarchy of properties of properties of properties
|
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
|
16452
|
Dispositions have modal properties, of which properties things would have counterfactually
|
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
|
16467
|
'Socrates is essentially human' seems to say nothing could be Socrates if it was not human
|
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
|
16453
|
The bundle theory makes the identity of indiscernibles a necessity, since the thing is the properties
|
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
|
16466
|
Strong necessity is always true; weak necessity is cannot be false
|
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 2. Necessity as Primitive
|
16438
|
Necessity and possibility are fundamental, and there can be no reductive analysis of them
|
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
|
16436
|
Modal concepts are central to the actual world, and shouldn't need extravagant metaphysics
|
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism
|
16433
|
Given actualism, how can there be possible individuals, other than the actual ones?
|
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
|
16444
|
Possible worlds don't reduce modality, they regiment it to reveal its structure
|
|
16445
|
I think of worlds as cells (rather than points) in logical space
|
|
16437
|
Possible worlds are properties
|
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
|
16454
|
Modal properties depend on the choice of a counterpart, which is unconstrained by metaphysics
|
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism
|
16450
|
Anti-haecceitism says there is no more to an individual than meeting some qualitative conditions
|
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
|
16474
|
How can we know what we are thinking, if content depends on something we don't know?
|
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
|
16461
|
We still lack an agreed semantics for quantifiers in natural language
|
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
|
16448
|
Possible world semantics may not reduce modality, but it can explain it
|
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
|
16442
|
I take propositions to be truth conditions
|
|
16447
|
A theory of propositions at least needs primitive properties of consistency and of truth
|
19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
|
16446
|
Propositions presumably don't exist if the things they refer to don't exist
|