Ideas from 'Writing the Book of the World' by Theodore Sider [2011], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Writing the Book of the World' by Sider,Theodore [OUP 2011,978-0-19-969790-8]].
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1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
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15010
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Your metaphysics is 'cheating' if your ontology won't support the beliefs you accept
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1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
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14977
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Metaphysics is not about what exists or is true or essential; it is about the structure of reality
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14994
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Extreme doubts about metaphysics also threaten to undermine the science of unobservables
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1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
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15003
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It seems unlikely that the way we speak will give insights into the universe
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1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
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14986
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Conceptual analysts trust particular intuitions much more than general ones
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2. Reason / D. Definition / 13. Against Definition
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14981
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Philosophical concepts are rarely defined, and are not understood by means of definitions
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15015
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It seems possible for a correct definition to be factually incorrect, as in defining 'contact'
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3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
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14992
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We don't care about plain truth, but truth in joint-carving terms
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / b. Objects make truths
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15012
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Orthodox truthmaker theories make entities fundamental, but that is poor for explanation
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4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
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15023
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The Barcan schema implies if X might have fathered something, there is something X might have fathered
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4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
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15004
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'Gunk' is an object in which proper parts all endlessly have further proper parts
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4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 3. Axioms of Mereology
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14984
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Which should be primitive in mereology - part, or overlap?
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5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
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14980
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There is a real issue over what is the 'correct' logic
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15000
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'It is raining' and 'it is not raining' can't be legislated, so we can't legislate 'p or ¬p'
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5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
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15020
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Classical logic is good for mathematics and science, but less good for natural language
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5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
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15029
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Modal accounts of logical consequence are simple necessity, or essential use of logical words
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5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
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15019
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Define logical constants by role in proofs, or as fixed in meaning, or as topic-neutral
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5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 4. Natural Deduction
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15001
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'Tonk' is supposed to follow the elimination and introduction rules, but it can't be so interpreted
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
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15017
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Supervenience is a modal connection
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / b. Types of fundamental
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15008
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Is fundamentality in whole propositions (and holistic), or in concepts (and atomic)?
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15013
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Tables and chairs have fundamental existence, but not fundamental natures
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
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15014
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Unlike things, stuff obeys unrestricted composition and mereological essentialism
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 9. States of Affairs
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15009
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We must distinguish 'concrete' from 'abstract' and necessary states of affairs.
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / d. Commitment of theories
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14983
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Accept the ontology of your best theory - and also that it carves nature at the joints
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
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14978
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A property is intrinsic if an object alone in the world can instantiate it
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
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14995
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Predicates can be 'sparse' if there is a universal, or if there is a natural property or relation
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
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15026
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Essence (even if nonmodal) is not fundamental in metaphysics
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10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
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15030
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Humeans say that we decide what is necessary
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15031
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Modal terms in English are entirely contextual, with no modality outside the language
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10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 3. Necessity by Convention
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15027
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If truths are necessary 'by convention', that seems to make them contingent
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15028
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Conventionalism doesn't seem to apply to examples of the necessary a posteriori
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10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
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15033
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Humeans says mathematics and logic are necessary because that is how our concept of necessity works
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10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
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15025
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The world does not contain necessity and possibility - merely how things are
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14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
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14988
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A theory which doesn't fit nature is unexplanatory, even if it is true
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14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 8. Ramsey Sentences
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14982
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If I used Ramsey sentences to eliminate fundamentality from my theory, that would be a real loss
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14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
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14989
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Problem predicates in induction don't reflect the structure of nature
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14997
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Two applications of 'grue' do not guarantee a similarity between two things
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14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
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14990
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Bayes produces weird results if the prior probabilities are bizarre
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
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15005
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Explanations must cite generalisations
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / b. Ultimate explanation
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15011
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If the ultimate explanation is a list of entities, no laws, patterns or mechanisms can be cited
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15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
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15018
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Intentionality is too superficial to appear in the catalogue of ultimate physics
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
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14999
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Prior to conventions, not all green things were green?
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19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
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14998
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Conventions are contingent and analytic truths are necessary, so that isn't their explanation
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19. Language / E. Analyticity / 4. Analytic/Synthetic Critique
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15016
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Analyticity has lost its traditional role, which relied on truth by convention
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26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
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14985
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The notion of law doesn't seem to enhance physical theories
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14987
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Many of the key theories of modern physics do not appear to be 'laws'
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27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 4. Substantival Space
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14991
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Space has real betweenness and congruence structure (though it is not the Euclidean concepts)
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27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 6. Space-Time
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15021
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The central question in the philosophy of time is: How alike are time and space?
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27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / f. Eternalism
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15024
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The spotlight theorists accepts eternal time, but with a spotlight of the present moving across it
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