Ideas from 'Truth and Predication' by Donald Davidson [2005], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Truth and Predication' by Davidson,Donald [Belknap Harvard 2005,0-674-01525-8]].
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3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
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19160
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A comprehensive theory of truth probably includes a theory of predication
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3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
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19151
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Antirealism about truth prevents its use as an intersubjective standard
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3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 8. Subjective Truth
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19144
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'Epistemic' truth depends what rational creatures can verify
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3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
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19148
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There is nothing interesting or instructive for truths to correspond to
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19167
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Two sentences can be rephrased by equivalent substitutions to correspond to the same thing
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19166
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The Slingshot assumes substitutions give logical equivalence, and thus identical correspondence
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3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
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19150
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Coherence truth says a consistent set of sentences is true - which ties truth to belief
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3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth
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19145
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We can explain truth in terms of satisfaction - but also explain satisfaction in terms of truth
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19146
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Satisfaction is a sort of reference, so maybe we can define truth in terms of reference?
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19174
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Axioms spell out sentence satisfaction. With no free variables, all sequences satisfy the truths
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3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
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19136
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Many say that Tarski's definitions fail to connect truth to meaning
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19139
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Tarski does not tell us what his various truth predicates have in common
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19172
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To define a class of true sentences is to stipulate a possible language
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19147
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Truth is the basic concept, because Convention-T is agreed to fix the truths of a language
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3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth
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19153
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Truth is basic and clear, so don't try to replace it with something simpler
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3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
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19170
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Tarski is not a disquotationalist, because you can assign truth to a sentence you can't quote
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5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 4. Satisfaction
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19140
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'Satisfaction' is a generalised form of reference
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
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19173
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Treating predicates as sets drops the predicate for a new predicate 'is a member of', which is no help
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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 6. Probability
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19142
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Probability can be constrained by axioms, but that leaves open its truth nature
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15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
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19169
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Predicates are a source of generality in sentences
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
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19149
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If we reject corresponding 'facts', we should also give up the linked idea of 'representations'
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
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19163
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You only understand an order if you know what it is to obey it
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19152
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Utterances have the truth conditions intended by the speaker
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
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19162
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Meaning involves use, but a sentence has many uses, while meaning stays fixed
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / a. Sentence meaning
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19131
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We recognise sentences at once as linguistic units; we then figure out their parts
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
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19176
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The concept of truth can explain predication
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19156
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Modern predicates have 'places', and are sentences with singular terms deleted from the places
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality
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19133
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If you assign semantics to sentence parts, the sentence fails to compose a whole
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
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19132
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Top-down semantic analysis must begin with truth, as it is obvious, and explains linguistic usage
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19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
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19158
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'Humanity belongs to Socrates' is about humanity, so it's a different proposition from 'Socrates is human'
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19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
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19154
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The principle of charity says an interpreter must assume the logical constants
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19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / d. Metaphor
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19161
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We indicate use of a metaphor by its obvious falseness, or trivial truth
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