Ideas from 'The Structure of Paradoxes of Self-Reference' by Graham Priest [1994], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Mind' (ed/tr -) [- ,]].
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5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 1. Paradox
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13373
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Typically, paradoxes are dealt with by dividing them into two groups, but the division is wrong
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5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / b. König's paradox
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13368
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The 'least indefinable ordinal' is defined by that very phrase
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5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / c. Berry's paradox
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13370
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'x is a natural number definable in less than 19 words' leads to contradiction
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5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / d. Richard's paradox
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13369
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By diagonalization we can define a real number that isn't in the definable set of reals
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5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / c. Burali-Forti's paradox
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13366
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The least ordinal greater than the set of all ordinals is both one of them and not one of them
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5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / e. Mirimanoff's paradox
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13367
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The next set up in the hierarchy of sets seems to be both a member and not a member of it
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5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
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If you know that a sentence is not one of the known sentences, you know its truth
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13372
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There are Liar Pairs, and Liar Chains, which fit the same pattern as the basic Liar
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