Ideas from 'Definitiones cogitationesque metaphysicae' by Gottfried Leibniz [1678], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Leibniz Akademie Edition' by Leibniz,Gottfried (ed/tr [Berlin Akademie]) [Berline Akademie 1999,]].

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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined

12712

Substance is that which can act

			Full Idea: I define substance as that which can act.
			From: Gottfried Leibniz (Definitiones cogitationesque metaphysicae [1678], A6.4.1398), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 3
			A reaction: This is in tune with the notion that to exist is to have causal powers. I find the view congenial, and the middle period of Leibniz's thought, before monads became too spiritual, chimes in with my view.

14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / b. Ultimate explanation

12737

Nature can be fully explained by final causes alone, or by efficient causes alone

			Full Idea: All the phenomena of nature can be explained solely by final causes, exactly as if there were no efficient causes; and all the phenomena of nature can be explained solely by efficient causes, as if there were no final causes.
			From: Gottfried Leibniz (Definitiones cogitationesque metaphysicae [1678], A6.4.1403), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 6
			A reaction: Somewhat speculative (a virtue!), but it is interesting to see him suggesting that there might be two complete and satisfactory explanations, which never touched one another. I can't see Aristotle agreeing with that.