Ideas from 'Essential Attribution' by Ruth Barcan Marcus [1971], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Journal of Philosophy' (ed/tr -) [- ,]].

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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism

11184

Aristotelian essentialism is about shared properties, individuating essentialism about distinctive properties

11181

Aristotelian essentialism involves a 'natural' or 'causal' interpretation of modal operators

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities

11185

'Is essentially' has a different meaning from 'is necessarily', as they often cannot be substituted

11180

Essentialist sentences are not theorems of modal logic, and can even be false

11186

'Essentially' won't replace 'necessarily' for vacuous properties like snub-nosed or self-identical

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences

11182

If essences are objects with only essential properties, they are elusive in possible worlds

10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds

11183

The use of possible worlds is to sort properties (not to individuate objects)

10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation

11187

In possible worlds, names are just neutral unvarying pegs for truths and predicates

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism

11189

Dispositional essences are special, as if an object loses them they cease to exist