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| 24232 | Truth is speaking what is and things that are |
| Full Idea: The person who speaks what is and the things that are speaks the truth. | |||
| From: Plato (Euthydemus [c.385 BCE], 284a) | |||
| A reaction: We now use 'facts' for what is, and 'real' or 'actual' things for what are. I'm perfectly happy with that conception of truth. Demanding something more precise called 'correspondence' looks hopeless. You have to believe there are facts. |
| 24233 | If speech is making something, then lies are impossible |
| Full Idea: If speaking is doing and making then nobody speaks things that are not, since he would then be making something, and no one is capable of making something that is not. So according to your own statement, nobody tells lies. | |||
| From: Plato (Euthydemus [c.385 BCE], 284c) | |||
| A reaction: This problem pops up again in the twentieth century, with the quest for logical form. How can a lie be meaningful if it doesn't refer to anything? |
| 304 | Beautiful things must be different from beauty itself, but beauty itself must be present in each of them |
| Full Idea: Are fine things different from or identical to fineness? They are different from fineness itself, but fineness itself is in a sense present in each of them. | |||
| From: Plato (Euthydemus [c.385 BCE], 301a) |
| 16120 | Knowing how to achieve immortality is pointless without the knowledge how to use immortality |
| Full Idea: If there exists the knowledge of how to make men immortal, but without the knowledge of how to use this immortality, there seems to be no value in it. | |||
| From: Plato (Euthydemus [c.385 BCE], 289b) | |||
| A reaction: I take this to be not a gormless utilitarianism about knowledge, but a plea for holism, that knowledge only has value as part of some larger picture. The big view is the important view. He's wrong, though. Work out the use later. |
| 303 | Say how many teeth the other has, then count them. If you are right, we will trust your other claims |
| Full Idea: If each of you says how many teeth the other has, and when they are counted we find you do know, we will believe your other claims as well. | |||
| From: Plato (Euthydemus [c.385 BCE], 294c) | |||
| A reaction: This is the clairvoyant problem for reliabilism, if truth is delivered for no apparent reason. Useful, but hardly knowledge. HOW did you know the number of teeth? |
| 302 | What knowledge is required to live well? |
| Full Idea: What knowledge would enable us to live finely for the rest of our lives? | |||
| From: Plato (Euthydemus [c.385 BCE], 293a) | |||
| A reaction: A successful grasp of other people's points of view might lead to respect for them. Also a realisation that we are not isolated individuals. We really are all in it together. |
| 301 | Only knowledge of some sort is good |
| Full Idea: Nothing is good except knowledge of some sort. | |||
| From: Plato (Euthydemus [c.385 BCE], 292b) | |||
| A reaction: I've heard it suggested that truth is the only value. This is the Socratic idea that moral goodness is a matter of successful rational judgement. Not convinced, but interesting. |
| 305 | Something which lies midway between two evils is better than either of them |
| Full Idea: Something which is composed of two factors which are bad for different purposes and lies midway between them is better than either of the factors. | |||
| From: Plato (Euthydemus [c.385 BCE], 306a) |