more from David M. Armstrong

Single Idea 18467

[catalogued under 3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism]

Full Idea

Truth-making cannot be any form of entailment. Both terms of an entailment relation must be propositions, but the truth-making term of the truth-making relation is a portion of reality, and, in general at least, portions of reality are not propositions.

Gist of Idea

Truth-making can't be entailment, because truthmakers are portions of reality


David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 02.3)

Book Reference

Armstrong,D.M.: 'Truth and Truthmakers' [CUP 2004], p.5

A Reaction

Along with Idea 18466, that seems to firmly demolish the idea that truth-making is a logical entailment.

Related Ideas

Idea 18466 If truthmaking is classical entailment, then anything whatsoever makes a necessary truth [MacBride]

Idea 18675 Kant may rate two things as finally valuable: having a good will, and deserving happiness [Orsi on Kant]