more from Cynthia Macdonald

Single Idea 7971

[catalogued under 8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta]

Full Idea

All real forms of Nominalism should hold that the only objects relevant to the explanation of generality are concrete particulars, words (i.e. word-tokens, not word-types), and perhaps sets.

Gist of Idea

Real Nominalism is only committed to concrete particulars, word-tokens, and (possibly) sets


Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.6 n16)

Book Reference

Macdonald,Cynthia: 'Varieties of Things' [Blackwell 2005], p.255

A Reaction

The addition of sets seems controversial (see Idea 7970). The context is her rejection of the use of tropes in nominalist theories. I would doubt whether a theory still counted as nominalist if it admitted sets (e.g. Quine).

Related Idea

Idea 7670 Kant is the father of the notion of exploitation as an evil [Kant, by Berlin]