more from Cynthia Macdonald

Single Idea 7932

[catalogued under 9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique]

Full Idea

Commitment to the view that only what can be an object of possible sensory experience can exist eliminates the possibility of distinguishing between substance and attribute, leaving only one alternative, namely the bundle view.

Gist of Idea

A phenomenalist cannot distinguish substance from attribute, so must accept the bundle view


Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.3)

Book Reference

Macdonald,Cynthia: 'Varieties of Things' [Blackwell 2005], p.84

A Reaction

Phenomenalism strikes me as a paradigm case of confusing ontology with epistemology. Presumably physicists (even empiricist ones) are committed to the 'interior' of quarks and electrons, but no one expects to experience them.