Single Idea 4375

[catalogued under 22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism]

Full Idea

The emotivist gets things backwards: evaluations are not disguised emotions; instead, emotions are types of evaluation.

Gist of Idea

Evaluations are not disguised emotions; instead, emotion is a type of evaluation


Deborah Achtenberg (Cognition of Value in Aristotle's Ethics [2002], 6.1)

Book Reference

Achtenberg,Deborah: 'Cognition of Value in Aristotle's Ethics' [SUNY 2002], p.161

A Reaction

A nice comment, though a bit optimistic. It is certainly a valuable corrective to emotivist to pin down the cognitive and evaluative aspects of emotion, rather than regarding them as 'raw' feelings.

Related Idea

Idea 23961 The heart of an emotion is its judgement of values and morality [Solomon]