more from R.D. Ingthorsson

Single Idea 22609

[catalogued under 5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 5. First-Order Logic]

Full Idea

First-order predicate logic was accepted so easily by the philosophical community …because philosophy was already geared toward a neo-Humean view of both science and philosophy as primarily descriptive rather than explanatory.

Gist of Idea

Philosophers accepted first-order logic, because they took science to be descriptive, not explanatory


R.D. Ingthorsson (A Powerful Particulars View of Causation [2021], 1.8)

Book Reference

'Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Time', ed/tr. Callender,Craig [OUP 2013], p.15

A Reaction

The point, I think, is that explanatory thinking needs second-order logic, where the properties (or powers) are players in the game, and not just adjuncts of the catalogue of objects. I find this idea mind-expanding. (That's a good thing).

Related Idea

Idea 22610 It is difficult to handle presentism in first-order logic [Ingthorsson]