more from Daniel M. Mittag

Single Idea 19723

[catalogued under 13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / b. Evidentialism]

Full Idea

If one came to believe p with good evidence, but has since forgotten that evidence, we might think one can continue to believe justifiably, but evidentialism appears unable to account for this.

Gist of Idea

Evidentialism can't explain that we accept knowledge claims if the evidence is forgotten


Daniel M. Mittag (Evidentialism [2011], 'Forgotten')

Book Reference

'Routledge Companion to Epistemology', ed/tr. Bernecker,S/Pritchard,D [Routledge 2014], p.173

A Reaction

We would still think that the evidence was important, and we would need to trust the knower's claim that the forgotten evidence was good. So it doesn't seem to destroy the evidentialist thesis.