more from Daniel M. Mittag

Single Idea 19721

[catalogued under 13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique]

Full Idea

Traditional coherence theories seem unable to account for the role experience plays in justification.

Gist of Idea

Coherence theories struggle with the role of experience


Daniel M. Mittag (Evidentialism [2011], 'Evidence')

Book Reference

'Routledge Companion to Epistemology', ed/tr. Bernecker,S/Pritchard,D [Routledge 2014], p.169

A Reaction

I'm inclined to say that experience only becomes a justification when it has taken propositional (though not necessarily lingistic) form. That is, when you see it 'as' something. Uninterpreted shape and colour can justify virtually nothing.