more from Duncan Pritchard

Single Idea 19507

[catalogued under 13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique]

Full Idea

Crucially, radical sceptical error-possibilities are never epistemically motivated, but are instead merely raised.

Gist of Idea

Radical scepticism is merely raised, and is not a response to worrying evidence


Duncan Pritchard (Epistemological Disjunctivism [2012], 3.5)

Book Reference

Pritchard,Duncan: 'Epistemological Disjunctivism' [OUP 2012], p.126

A Reaction

In 'The Matrix' someone sees a glitch in the software (a cat crossing a passageway), and that would have to be taken seriously. Otherwise it is a nice strategy to ask why the sceptic is raising this bizzare possibility, without evidence.