more from Duncan Pritchard

Single Idea 19497

[catalogued under 13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / c. Disjunctivism]

Full Idea

Metaphysical disjunctivists hold that veridical perceptual experiences are not essentially the same as the experiences involved in corresponding cases involving illusion and (especially) hallucination.

Gist of Idea

Metaphysical disjunctivism says normal perceptions and hallucinations are different experiences


Duncan Pritchard (Epistemological Disjunctivism [2012], 1.4)

Book Reference

Pritchard,Duncan: 'Epistemological Disjunctivism' [OUP 2012], p.23

A Reaction

Metaphysical disjunctivism concerns what the experiences are; epistemological justification concerns the criteria of justification. I think. I wish Pritchard would spell things out more clearly. Indeed, I wish all philosophers would.

Related Idea

Idea 19496 Disjunctivism says perceptual justification must be both factual and known by the agent [Pritchard,D]