more from Bob Hale

Single Idea 19278

[catalogued under 7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / c. Facts and truths]

Full Idea

There is no clear gap between its being a fact that p and its being true that p, no obvious way to individuate the fact a true statement records other than via that statement's truth-conditions.

Gist of Idea

There is no gap between a fact that p, and it is true that p; so we only have the truth-condtions for p


Bob Hale (Necessary Beings [2013], 03.2)

Book Reference

Hale,Bob: 'Necessary Beings' [OUP 2013], p.68

A Reaction

Typical of philosophers of language. The concept of a fact is of something mind-independent; the concept of a truth is of something mind-dependent. They can't therefore be the same thing (by the contrapositive of the indiscernability of identicals!).